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Summary
In Singapore, about 80 % of electricity is generated from natural gas. Natu-
ral gas supply for a power generation company (GENCO) is usually regulated
through the use of provision contracts in addition to market transactions. With
increasingly volatile gas prices in the deregulated environment, the profitability
of a GENCO heavily relies on its ability to manage the portfolio of natural gas
contract and spot trading. This thesis mainly concerns about the management of
natural gas supply and contract gas allocation and valuation taking into account
the volatile gas prices and various contractual flexibilities.
In this thesis, we first study the optimization problem of dynamically allocat-
ing contracted gas over a short-term horizon. It is shown that a price and stage
dependent base stock policy is optimal and the related optimal target levels mono-
tonically decrease with the spot price. With a trinomial price scenario tree, these
target levels can be easily computed to facilitate prompt contracted gas allocation.
Numerical analyses demonstrate the importance of taking price volatility into
consideration in the decision making process. Subsequently, we develop a novel
scheme to price a bilateral gas contract. By incorporating the contract valuations
for both the GENCO and the natural gas supplier, we unveil that there is always a
possibility for both contracting parties to negotiate and reach a unique mutually
acceptable equilibrium. The feasibility of the proposed pricing framework is vali-
dated by numerical results under various market conditions. Lastly, we consider a
medium-term contract allocation problem with hierarchically structured sequen-
tial decision making induced by emerging make up clause. A multi-time scale
Markov decision process (MMDP) model is proposed to address the interaction
of decision makings in two different time scales of short-term and medium-term.
We also contribute to developing a least-squares policy iteration (LSPI) algorithm
in conjunction with a finite difference stochastic approximation (FDSA) method
to solve the MMDP problem involving decision dependent uncertainty. Moreover,
ix
we rigorously establish the convergence guarantee and performance bound of
the proposed algorithm. Extensive numerical experiments show that our LSPI al-
gorithm outperforms the standard DP method, especially for a realistically sized
problem.
In summary, this thesis may provide valuable insights on dynamic energy
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This chapter introduces natural gas supply management and contract allocation
and valuation for a power generation company. The background of this research
is presented in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 clarifies the motivation for natural gas
supply management and contract allocation and valuation. In Section 1.3, we
review the literature related to the development of natural gas supply portfolio
optimization problem and recent advances in contract allocation and valuation
in energy (mainly natural gas) market. Based on the brief review, research gaps
of current studies are highlighted and the objectives of this thesis are presented
in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 outlines the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Background
Electricity is generated from other sources of primary energy, such as coal, natural
gas, nuclear and wind etc. Among these predominant generation sources, natural
gas is considered as a promising fuel for power generation due to its clean burn-
ing nature and low generation expenditure. According to official world energy
statistics released by the International Energy Agency (IEA), electricity generated
by natural gas accounted for around 21.9% of worldwide electricity production
in 2011, ranking only second to coal-fired power. In Singapore, about 80% of
the electricity supplied to the national power grid was produced from natural
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gas (Tan et al., 2010). Furthermore, the demand for natural gas-fired power
generation is continuously growing. Based on the estimation of the Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA), the proportion of natural gas-fired electricity will
rise from 15% in 2000 up to 33% in 2020 in the United States (Tan et al., 2010).
With gas-fired power plants becoming increasingly popular, natural gas supply
management has attracted considerable interest from researchers and practition-
ers. The relevance of the topic is apparent for the power generation companies
(GENCOs), as fuel cost accounts for more than 70% of total generation cost for
gas-fired power plants (Chang and Hin Tay, 2006).
Natural gas has been traded as a commodity in a fully competitive market af-
ter deregulation (Juris, 1998a). However, the optimization of natural gas supply
solely from spot trading is all but a trivial problem. In fact, due to price stochastic-
ity, natural gas supply is usually regulated through the use of provision contracts
in addition to market transactions. In light of this, it is worth providing more
details both on the characteristics of natural gas spot prices (Section 1.1.1) as
well as the features of contracts commonly adopted in the sector (Section 1.1.2).
1.1.1 Natural Gas Prices
Natural gas spot prices, as with other commodity prices, are mainly driven by bal-
ancing supply and demand under the market-clearing mechanism (Juris, 1998a).
The resulting market-clearing prices reflect the local short-run marginal cost of
natural gas. In practice, natural gas spot prices frequently vary over time, espe-
cially in the deregulated market. In essence, the price fluctuation is caused by
shifts in the equilibrium of supply and demand (Henning et al., 2003), which can
be brought back to a wide range of causes, e.g., the weather conditions, fuel com-
petitions, domestic economic growth and so on. The degree of price variations
is commonly defined as price volatility, which is measured in terms of percent
differences of the adjacent daily spot price (Henning et al., 2003).
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Figure 1.1: Henry Hub spot price (1991-2010)
Figure 1.1 shows the daily gas spot prices in Henry Hub (data collected from
Bloomberg service) over the past 20 years. We can notice a general increasing
trend in the time series, without considering the surged spikes caused by financial
crisis or international political events. Furthermore, we also observe the increases
in natural gas price volatility, especially since 2000.
To manage the price volatility, participants will resort to various financial
tools, such as contracts, storage, options, swaps, for hedging (Graves and Levine,
2010). Among these tools, contracts are the most widely applied in practice
because of their variability in the deregulated environment.
1.1.2 Natural Gas Contracts
A gas contract is a purchase and sale agreement between a buyer and a supplier
that specifies the total amount of contract gas for delivery over a finite time
horizon at a predetermined contract price. Engaging into a contract allows the
market participants to lock in prices for a portion of gas supply in advance. Thus,
the contract can help to hedge against the risk of adverse market moves resulting
in unanticipated losses. On the other hand, the contract may also enable the
3
market participants to make profits (or reduce costs) by taking advantage of
favorable price moves. To avoid arbitrage, the contract price should be higher
than the expected spot price, subject to an additional premium. In other words,
the contract buyer sacrifices its profit opportunity in exchange for hedging risk.
Shorter Contract Length
Prior to restructure and deregulation, the natural gas industry was vertically
integrated with all transactions tightly regulated and completed under long-term
contracts. Such contracts typically cover gas delivery for up to 20-30 years and
specify take-or-pay clauses to support investments in natural gas production
and transportation infrastructures. Under these minimum obligation provisions,
market participants (marketers, local distribution companies and large end users)
are forced to pay for a minimum amount of gas regardless of delivery. Thus, all
participants were locked into a long-term contractual relationship, impeding
competition in the industry (Juris, 1998a).
Figure 1.2: Contract length for gas contracts 1980-2005 (Hedge and Fjeldstad,
2010)
After deregulation, unbundling of gas sales from pipeline transportation has
led to the emergence of both natural gas and transportation market, where nat-
ural gas and transportation services are traded separately (Juris, 1998b). This
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separation gives market participants little incentive to lock into a long-term con-
tract with take-or-pay obligation. Consequently, gas contracts with shorter tenure
become more appealing. As presented in Figure 1.2, the life spans of natural gas
contracts have on average decreased from 30 years to 15 years since 1980. In
2003, the contract duration can even be as short as two years. This phenomenon
can be mainly attributed to such contracts’ ability to offer the buyers more flex-
ibility to accommodate the ever changing market environment (Juris, 1998a).
Therefore, medium- and short-term gas contracts have gained more and more
popularity in the industry (Sen et al., 2006; Chen and Baldick, 2007; Cabero
et al., 2010).
Diverse Contract Flexibility
In the deregulated natural gas industry, many contracts have been designed to
offer volumetric flexibility. One of the most well known quantity flexible contract
is swing or take-or-pay contracts that have been widely used in energy markets to
manage the volatile spot prices and stochastic demands (Joskow, 1985; Thomp-
son, 1995; Clewlow and Strickland, 2000; Jaillet et al., 2004). A typical swing
gas contract enables the option holder to exercise the right to receive variable
daily quantities of natural gas on demand, subject to daily and periodic (monthly
or annual) constraints as well as minimum obligation (Breslin et al., 2008). How-
ever, the buyers have to undertake the risk of paying gas that is not actually taken
due to demand uncertainty.
In recent years, new volumetric flexibility, called “make up” and “carry for-
ward” clauses (Edoli et al., 2013), emerged as a supplement to the traditional
minimum obligation terms in energy contracts. Basically, these clauses allow the
purchasers to violate the periodic withdrawal constraints to some extent and
delay (or offset respectively) the delivery in subsequent periods under certain
conditions. For instance, the make up clause enables contract holders to bank the
take-or-pay gas that has been paid for but not taken yet and carry it over to the
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subsequent period. Those natural gas in the make up bank is not available for
reclaim until the cumulative contract delivery amount exceeds the take-or-pay
level (or predetermined reference level). Interested readers can refer to Løland
and Lindqvist (2008) and references therein for more information on make up
and carry forward clauses. Above all, the emergence of volumetric flexibility
brings benefits, but it further complicates operations management and contract
valuation.
1.2 Motivation
Most existing literature related to GENCOs paid close attention to power portfolio
optimization and generation scheduling, since these two aspects are directly and
closely related to the profit and risk exposure of a GENCO (Carrio´n et al., 2007;
Conejo et al., 2008; Frangioni and Gentile, 2006; Cerisola et al., 2009). However,
the major drawback of the aforementioned works is that the procurement cost
and risk from the fuel supply side are almost neglected. In view of the high share
(70%) of fuel cost in the total generation cost, it is highly imperative to develop
a plan for strategic gas supply management to reap more fuel cost savings.
Natural gas supply management is crucial for natural gas-fired GENCOs, es-
pecially after the structural deregulation of natural gas industry. It has been
reported that natural gas prices are substantially volatile, ranking second only to
electricity among commonly traded commodities. (Hale, 2002). The extremely
volatile spot prices have led to increasing investment costs and substantial finan-
cial risks for the GENCOs, as the companies directly use gas prices as a barometer
in the absence of real-time supply and demand information. To mitigate such
risks, they would lock a proportion of natural gas supply by engaging into bi-
lateral forward contracts. With natural gas spot prices becoming increasingly
volatile, the profitability of the GENCOs heavily relies on their ability to manage
natural gas portfolios of contracts and market transaction.
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In deregulated gas markets, contracts with shorter life span offer the GENCOs
the flexibility to adjust their contract portfolios in response to the ever-changing
market conditions. Besides, natural gas contracts are commonly equipped with
volumetric flexibility that allows the GENCOs to strategically allocate its con-
tracted gas. Above all, contractual flexibility gives GENCOs the opportunity to
acquire natural gas in a least-cost manner in deregulated gas markets.
Therefore, this thesis mainly concerns the optimization problem of dynam-
ically allocating contracted gas over a finite planning horizon (short-term or
medium-term) taking into account the volatile spot gas prices and various con-
tractual flexibilities.
1.3 Natural Gas Supply Portfolio and Contract Allo-
cation and Valuation: A Brief Review
Depending on whether multiple contracts or a single contract is involved in
the optimization framework, the literature can be broadly classified into two
branches: natural gas supply portfolio and contract allocation and valuation. The
former branch (Section 1.3.1) mainly addresses natural gas procurement strat-
egy of selecting a combination of multiple supply contracts and storage facilities
(if available), while the latter branch (Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) tackles the opti-
mization problem of single contract allocation and valuation in the presence of
market transaction.
1.3.1 Natural Gas Supply Portfolio
The study of natural gas supply portfolio can be dated back to O’Neill et al.
(1979), where a large-scale deterministic network model was developed for the
supply and distribution of natural gas in an intrastate pipeline system. The sys-
tem managed natural gas supply by collecting gas from a set of supply nodes and
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then distributing to demand nodes. The deterministic network model took mass
preservation and pressure constraints into consideration, but failed to account
for demand variability. Subsequently, the model was extended to analyze ser-
vice reliability for gas distribution utilities with incorporation of weather-related
demand uncertainty (Guldmann, 1983). A comprehensive chance-constrained
cost-minimization model was developed to analyze the interaction between gas
supply, storage and transportation contracts when demand variation was taken
into account. Following the fundamental study of Guldmann (1983), a variety of
comprehensive models were proposed to deal with gas supply portfolio optimiza-
tion over various supply, storage and transportation contracts (Guldmann, 1986;
Avery et al., 1992; Bopp et al., 1996; Guldmann and Wang, 1999). In addition
to natural gas supply portfolios, these works also shed light on other involved
financial and operational features, such as marginal cost pricing policy (Guld-
mann, 1986), contract pricing terms and storage pump capability (Avery et al.,
1992), deliverability and security (Bopp et al., 1996) and market curtailment and
trade-off between contract characteristics (Guldmann and Wang, 1999).
The works above focused more on the natural gas portfolio for a local distribu-
tion company, whereas another stream of research aimed to develop gas contract
portfolio strategies for gas fired GENCOs. Chen and Baldick (2007) studied the
portfolio optimization of short-term natural gas contracts with different deliv-
ery terms for an electric utility company. A risk-cost trade-off framework was
proposed to select the optimal contract combination in terms of total utilities.
Later on, the work was extended to simultaneously address natural gas supply
mix and energy portfolio optimization for a GENCO, taking into account the
interaction between natural gas and electricity market (Asif and Jirutitijaroen,
2009; Kittithreerapronchai et al., 2010; Jirutitijaroen et al., 2013). The models
proposed above provide managerial insights into the interaction of natural gas
and electricity markets, the role of natural gas storage and the distribution of
cost or profit. With incorporation of risk measurements and risk preferences of
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the GENCOs, these models can also manage financial risks caused by stochastic
prices and demands.
In the real world, the ever-changing market conditions drive the GENCOs to
promptly determine whether to supply the natural gas from contract withdrawal
or from spot market transaction. Hence, it is highly imperative for the GENCOs to
develop an optimal and convenient strategy for dynamically allocating contracted
gas in response to the volatile gas spot prices and stochastic demands. The
requirement stimulates another branch of research on contract allocation and
valuation, where the GENCO is assumed to engage into a single gas contract
with diverse volumetric flexibility. Based on the nature of decision making, either
at a single time scale or multiple time scales, the second branch of literature
can be further categorized into two streams, as elaborated in the following two
subsections.
1.3.2 Single-Time Scale Contract Allocation and Valuation
Traditionally, the operation of energy contract allocation was considered at a
single time scale, such as daily operation for a one-month problem or monthly
operation for a two-year problem. Hence, most of the existing literature related
to energy contract allocation and valuation falls into this stream.
In the attempt to value the swing contracts, Thompson (1995) adopted the
lattice-based method (Hull and White, 1993) to determine the optimal exercise
strategy for path dependent contingent claims. One drawback of this work is that
it is specified for only two special types of take-or-pay contracts. Subsequently,
the work was extended by Jaillet et al. (2004) to accommodate the most gen-
eral take-or-pay contracts with diverse variants. A dynamic programming based
framework was proposed to numerically price the swing contracts using dis-
cretized multi-layered trinomial forest. The proposed valuation framework can
also be generalized to a wide array of applications, such as valuation of storage
facility in energy market (Secomandi, 2010) and valuation of quantity flexible
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contracts in supply chain management (Bassok and Anupindi, 1997, 2008). It
should be noted that the proposed dynamic programming algorithm yields an
optimal decision rule represented by a look-up table, which allows the contract
holders to track the optimal actions for all possible states and stages. However,
the tabular representation is inaccurate due to discretization errors. Moreover,
the required computational effort blows up exponentially in terms of the dis-
cretization levels. Hence, it is highly imperative to derive an optimal policy that
is easy to implement in practice. We remark that base stock policies have been
applied to the operation of supply contracts in supply chain management (Bassok
and Anupindi, 1997) and the inventory trading of a gas storage facility (Seco-
mandi, 2010). But few work has been done on establishing such a convenient
optimal policy for energy contract allocation.
To tackle the computational complexity issue of the general valuation frame-
work in Jaillet et al. (2004), several numerical methods, such as least-squares
Monte Carlo (LSM), parametric approximation and numerical integration, have
been proposed to price take-or-pay contracts in a more efficient manner. Among
these approaches, the LSM method, first proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz
(2001) for pricing American options, has been widely applied in energy contract
valuation (Do¨rr, 2003; Meinshausen and Hambly, 2004; Thanawalla, 2006). By
combining backward dynamic programming and forward simulation of the un-
derlying price process together, the proposed LSM method significantly boosts
the computational efficiency. Another promising approach based on Monte Carlo
simulation was developed by Iba´n˜ez (2004) to value swing options via comput-
ing the optimal exercise frontier. Adopting the LSM methodology, Barrera-Esteve
et al. (2006) developed a Monte Carlo simulation based method for contract
valuation. Preliminary numerical results indicated that the optimal consump-
tion action appears to be either the minimum or the maximum value (bang-bang
style). Motivated by this observation, the authors further developed two paramet-
ric approximation algorithms for contract allocation and valuation. One major
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drawback of the numerical pricing methods is their lack of performance guaran-
tee, such as asymptotic convergence or error bound analysis. An in-depth review
on the valuation of commodity-based swing options was presented by Løland
and Lindqvist (2008).
It is worth noting that the aforementioned works mainly focus on the contract
buyers’ perspective. In reality, however, commodity-based contracts are typically
traded through bilateral negotiation, producing a mutually acceptable contract
price. Therefore, contract pricing framework should take both contracting parties
into account.
1.3.3 Multi-Time Scale Contract Allocation and Valuation
Recently, introducing make up and carry forward clauses into the traditional
take-or-pay contract poses great challenges for contract allocation and valuation,
as it naturally gives rise to an optimization problem with decision making at
multi-time scales. Moreover, the interaction of hierarchically structured decisions
in different time levels further complicates model formulation and algorithm
development.
Unfortunately, there has been relatively little work on quantitatively analyzing
the effects of make up and carry forward clauses on the optimal exercise strategy
and contract valuation. Holden et al. (2011) studied a long-term flexible gas
contract with extensive optionality including a carry forward clause. A least-
squares Monte Carlo simulation method was proposed to solve the problem of
determining the optimal exercise strategy and valuing the contract with carry
forward clause. The authors claimed that the make up clause can be evaluated
in a similar manner. However, Edoli et al. (2013) argued that the algorithm
tailored to carry forward clause cannot be directly applied to the make up clause,
where the delayed gas is paid under a double installment mechanism (Løland and
Lindqvist, 2008). Thus, Edoli et al. (2013) developed a novel bi-level dynamic
programming model for pricing peculiar swing contracts with make up clause.
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It was also shown that the proposed valuation framework can be adapted to
evaluate the carry forward clause and another form of make up clause. With the
help of an appropriate trinomial tree, the problems can be solved by standard
backward dynamic programming. However, its applications are limited to small
scale problems, since the computational effort explodes quickly as the problem
size grows. The incorporation of both make up clause and carry forward clause
in a unified contract valuation framework was first proposed by Chiarella et al.
(2011), where the rights of variable contract gas delivery are exercised on a
daily basis and decisions on the make up and carry forward usage are made
on an annual basis. A major weakness of this work is that it lacks an efficient
algorithm to solve the problem. Notwithstanding, these works have shed new
light on energy contract operation management at multi-time scales, especially
the role of make up clause. There is still some room for improvement. From
a modeling perspective, the aforementioned studies failed to account for the
interactions of decisions made in different time levels. There remains a need
for a model to address the coupling relationship between time scales, as well as
efficient algorithms for practical problem instances.
1.4 Research Gaps and Objectives
Based on the brief review presented above, the research gaps for current studies
on natural gas contract allocation and valuation can be summarized as follows:
• The existing literature fails to derive an adaptive policy that allows the
GENCO to promptly adjust its contract allocation strategy in response to
the revealed price and demand.
• In addition to gas contract portfolio optimization, the contract pricing issue
is of equal importance for the GENCO, which, however, has rarely been
addressed before.
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• Currently, there exists limited literature on modeling multi-time scale gas
contract allocation and valuation that take into account interactions be-
tween different time scales. Moreover, the existing literature lacks efficient
algorithms to solve the hierarchically structured sequential optimization
problem.
The overall aim of this thesis is to propose a unified framework for natural
gas contract allocation and valuation at single time-scale and multi-time scales.
Concretely, the specific objectives of this thesis are to:
• Propose an optimal policy which enables the GENCO to dynamically allo-
cate the natural gas contract in response to the frequently changing market
conditions.
• Develop a novel scheme for contract valuation and contract price deter-
mination to aid the contract negotiation between the GENCO and the gas
supplier.
• Propose a multi-time scale Markov decision process model for contract nom-
ination and allocation with a particular hierarchical structure. Develop a
provably convergent algorithm to solve the multi-time scale Markov deci-
sion process model efficiently.
The results of this work may provide some valuable insight into the impor-
tance of price volatility and value of make up clause in contract allocation and
valuation. In particular, this thesis may shed lights on:
• The value of stochastic solution that measures the expected gain from
solving a stochastic model.
• The impact of spot price volatility on the optimal contract price and associ-
ated optimal contract quantity.
• The value of incorporating a make up clause into the traditional take-or-pay
contract.
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1.5 Outline of Thesis
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The rest of the thesis is organized as
below.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed review on fundamentals of stochastic dynamic
programming and associated solution methodologies: backward dynamic pro-
gramming, approximate dynamic programming and least-squares Monte Carlo.
Subsequently, two commonly used policies for energy contract allocation (base
stock policy and bang-bang policy) are shortly discussed. Lastly, we briefly review
a multi-time scale Markov decision process model for hierarchically sequential
decision making induced by the make up clause.
In Chapter 3, we study the optimization problem of dynamically allocating
contract gas for a power generation company over a finite horizon taking into
account volatile spot prices. The problem is formulated as a multistage stochastic
dynamic program. We show that a stage and price dependent base stock policy
is optimal and the associated optimal base stock levels decrease with spot price.
With a proposed approximate spot price scenario tree, the optimal target levels
can be easily computed. At the end, numerical analysis on the value of stochastic
solution demonstrates that it is meaningful to incorporate price uncertainty in
the development of dynamic contract allocation strategy.
Chapter 4 covers the design of a mutually acceptable bilateral natural gas
contract for a GENCO and a gas supplier. Using the SDP model formulated in
Chapter 3, we are able to evaluate the value of the contract for the GENCO
and the supplier. By incorporating these two contract valuations, a Nash bargain
model is developed to determine the optimal contract price and the optimal
contract amount, simultaneously. The feasibility of the proposed contract pricing
framework is validated by numerical results under various market conditions.
In Chapter 5, the short-term natural gas supply management problem in Chap-
ter 3 is extended to a multi-time scale natural gas contract nomination and alloca-
tion problem taking into account additional contractual flexibility introduced by
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make up clause. We develop a multi-time scale Markov decision process (MMDP)
model to integrate the monthly nomination in a coarse time scale and daily con-
tract allocation in a fine time scale together in a unified framework. It is shown
that a threshold policy, characterized by monthly nomination and price, is optimal
for the lower time level MDP. We then propose a least-squares policy iteration
algorithm in conjunction with finite difference stochastic approximation to solve
the upper time level MDP efficiently. Last but not least, the value of make up
clause is quantified and the performance of the proposed algorithm is validated
by a series of numerical experiments.
Finally, we draw our conclusions with a summary of contributions of this
thesis and point out potential directions for future research in Chapter 6.
It is noteworthy that the short-term natural gas supply management problem
studied in Chapter 3 is the foundation of the contract price determination prob-
lem in Chapter 4. Besides, the lower level MDP model in Multi-time scale natural
gas contract allocation and valuation problem in Chapter 5 is a variant of SDP
model in Chapter 3. For given monthly nomination and make up gas, the daily
decisions in the lower time level are almost the same as those considered in the
short-term natural gas supply management, except the boundary condition. From
this point of view, Chapter 3 is the basis of MMDP in Chapter 5 as well. Moreover,
problems in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 can be categorized into short-term natural
gas supply and contract negotiation, whereas Chapter 5 tackles a medium-term
scheduling problem, involving the embedded short-term dynamic allocation prob-
lem. For a long-term contract, a renegotiation term is commonly written into the
contract, allowing the two contracting parties to adjust the contract terms for
every three to five years. Hence, a long-term contract valuation problem can
be transformed into a set of separable medium-term problems.as presented in





This chapter mainly reviews the stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) model
and the solution methods proposed in the context of energy contract allocation
and valuation. Section 2.1 outlines the fundamentals of stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming. Section 2.2 provides an overview of three methods adopted to solve
the SDP model optimally or approximately. In Section 2.3, we review two adap-
tive policies which are commonly used for energy contract allocation in literature
and practice. Lastly, multi-time scale Markov decision process (MMDP) models
for hierarchically sequential decision making are receiving increased attention
and a detailed review is provided in Section 2.4.
2.1 Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) is a powerful and popular way to address
sequential decision making under uncertainty over time. Depending on whether
the actions are taken at discrete time epochs or in a continuous time span, the
SDP model can be categorized into discrete-time SDP and continuous-time SDP.
In the field of natural gas supply and energy contract portfolios, operational
decisions and financial trades commonly take place periodically. Therefore, this
thesis primarily focuses on discrete-time SDP.
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Consider a general multistage stochastic optimization problem of T stages,
in which the uncertainties ω = (ω1, ω2, · · · , ωT ) are revealed as time pro-
gresses. We denote by Ωt the support of ωt for t = 1, 2, · · · , T . The decisions
a = (a1, a2, · · · , aT ) are made in response to the underlying stochastic process.
Note that each action at can be a scalar or a vector. Most of the existing works
on SDP are based on the following assumption
Assumption 2.1. (Dupacˇova´ and Sladky`, 2002) The probability distribution of the
stochastic process ω is known and independent of the decision process a.
Assumption 2.1 can be justified in situations where historical data or stochas-
tic simulation results can be used to extract information of the distribution and
the distribution is considerably stable over the periods (Shapiro and Philpott,
2007). A review of problems with probability distribution dependent on decision
is given in Section 2.4.1.
Let st ∈ St and at ∈ At be the continuous state and corresponding action at
stage t, where St and At refer to the state space and action space, respectively.
The evolution of the state variable st+1 can, therefore, be described by
st+1 = Ft(st, at, ωt+1) (2.1)
where Ft : St ×At × Ωt+1 → St+1 refers to a state transition function. It is worth
noting that the decision at is made in response to the state variable st and the
observed information ωt, which can be expressed by a mapping at = At(st, ωt)
from St × Ωt to At. A sequence of such decision mappings pi = (A1, A2, · · · , AT )
is referred to as a “policy”. A policy is feasible if all the decision rules At,∀t =
1, 2, · · · , T are feasible, i.e. at = At(st, ωt) ∈ At,∀t = 1, 2, · · · , T .
Denote by Apit (st, ωt) a particular decision rule specified by a feasible policy pi.
Let Ct(st, at) be the instantaneous contribution generated by the action at. Then
the objective function following the given feasible policy pi can be defined by the
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γt−1Ct(st, Apit (st, ωt))
]
(2.2)
where γ ∈ (0, 1] refers to the risk free discount rate, and the expectation is taken
with respect to the stochastic exogenous process ω. The primary concern is then








γt−1Ct(st, Apit (st, ωt))
]
s.t. st+1 = Ft(st, A
pi
t (st, ωt), ωt+1)
Apit (st, ωt) ∈ At,∀t = 1, 2, · · · , T (2.3)
where the initial state s1 is given and we also assume that all the expectations
exist without loss of generality (Dupacˇova´ and Sladky`, 2002). The formulation
(2.3) can be easily accommodated to the infinite horizon optimization problem
by letting T approach to infinity. It is remarked by Powell (2007) that building
the optimization problem (2.3) is an easy task, while computationally solving it
could be far more challenging.
Alternatively, we could reformulate the model by backward propagation.
The key idea is to set up recursive equations that depend on state variable
st and exogenous random variable ωt to capture the evolution of sequential







Cτ (sτ , aτ )|st
]
be the optimal value function from stage t
onward to the terminal stage for given state st.
Vt(st) = min
at∈At
Ct(st, at) + γE [Vt+1(Ft(st, at, ω˜t+1))|st] (2.4)
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with boundary condition VT+1(sT+1) = 0. The equation (2.4) is well known as
Bellman’s Equation (see Bertsekas et al., 1997; Powell, 2007; Puterman, 2009),
which characterizes the “principle of optimality” for an optimal policy.
2.2 Methodology
The optimality equation (2.4) not only provides an elegant SDP model in a com-
pact way, but also inspires a mechanism for solving such SDP model by backward
recursion. However, the usefulness of backward dynamic programming is limited
due to the curse of dimensionality, as shown in Section 2.2.1. To resolve this issue,
approximate dynamic programming (ADP) algorithm is introduced in Section
2.2.2. In particular, we review two popular ADP algorithms: approximate value
iteration and approximate policy iteration. As an alternative to ADP, another
approach “least-squares Monte Carlo” (LSM), which has enjoyed rich applica-
tions in the context of energy contract valuation, is reviewed in Section 2.2.3.
Furthermore, the comparison of these algorithmic strategies is briefly discussed
in Section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 Backward Dynamic Programming
A generic version of backward dynamic programming is displayed in Algorithm
1. In general, the algorithm requires a mild assumption that the state transition
function Ft(st, at, ω˜t+1) is known. Thus, we can derive the one-step transition
matrix P(st+1|st, at), which gives the probability of being in any state st+1 starting
from state st with action at. The expectation in (2.4) can be exactly computed




Algorithm 1 directly yields a tabular representation of a policy. It enables the
decision maker to track the optimal action a∗t (st) at any state st. However, this
tabular representation is cumbersome in the sense that it is required to store all
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Algorithm 1 Backward Dynamic Programming
• Step 0: Initialize boundary condition VT+1(sT+1) = 0 and let t = T − 1;
• Step 1: For all st ∈ St, solve the optimization problem
Vt(st) = min
at∈At




• Step 2: If t > 1, set t = t− 1 and go to step 1, otherwise stop.
the optimal value functions Vt(·) and all the optimal decisions a∗t (·) for all possi-
ble states in all stages. The memory storage requirement limits the widespread
applications of backward dynamic programming, due to the notorious “curse of
dimensionality” (Powell, 2007) which arises in a vast array of applications in real
world.
Curse of Dimensionality
Three curses of dimensionality are identified with respect to state variables, un-
certainty variables and vector-valued decision variables (Powell, 2009). The first
curse of dimensionality stems from multidimensional state variables, which was
recognized by Bellman (Bellman and Dreyfus, 1959). Consider a stock portfolio
optimization problem in Section 4.1 of Powell (2007) as an illustrative example,
in which as few as 10 different stocks can be traded in blocks of 100 shares. If
we can hold at most 10000 shares (equivalently 100 blocks) for each stock at a
given time epoch, then the number of possible stock portfolios can be as large
as 1020, meaning that it is impossible and impractical to list all combinations of
the state variables and store all the optimal value functions and corresponding
optimal decisions.
The second curse of dimensionality roots in the outcomes of the random
variables. Again, consider the stock portfolio example. For each possible state,
we need to compute the expectation for a given distribution of the underlying
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stochastic price process. Assume that the stochastic price process can be dis-
cretized into 10 possible price outcomes for each stock, we still need to consider
up to 1010 price scenarios in total. Hence, calculating the expectation with one
step transition matrix, extracted from the distribution of the price process, is also
challenging.
To make things worse, the minimization problem (2.4) should be solved for
each of the 1020 states and each of the 1010 price scenarios. Here comes the third
curse of dimensionality. For simplicity, we assume that 10 possible trading actions
for each stock are taken into account, resulting in 1010 combinations of actions
in all. The minimum value is achieved by enumerating all the possible actions.
Thus, we are required to loop over at least 1020 × 1010 × 1010 times during the
implementation of backward recursion. That is an intractable problem.
Despite the elegant and compact formulation and solution methodology pro-
vided by Bellman’s Equation, the example above indicates that backward dynamic
programming “does not work” even for problems with relatively small number of
states and actions (Powell, 2007). Many researchers from different communities,
ranging from machine learning, artificial intelligence to operations research, have
contributed to developing diverse approximation methods to overcome the curse
of dimensionality (Powell, 2007). Among these methods, approximate dynamic
programming appears to be popular for solving a general purpose MDP model.
2.2.2 Approximate Dynamic Programming
Approximate dynamic programming (ADP) refers to a broad family of approaches
and algorithms to efficiently solve an approximation of large scale dynamic pro-
gramming models of the type. The main idea of ADP is to step forward through
time and use an approximation of the optimal value function to guide decision
making, instead of performing backward computation. However, as the decision
making process highly depends on the value function approximation, the policy
search process can be easily misled because of biased value function approxima-
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tion. Therefore, a lot of effort has been devoted to searching for good policies
and simultaneously updating good value function approximations, a process that
is called “optimizing while learning” (Powell, 2007). Herein, we restrict our at-
tention to two general ADP algorithms: approximate value iteration (AVI) and
approximate policy iteration (API), where the policy is determined by a value
function approximation.
Approximate Value Iteration
Approximate value iteration is a widely used approximation algorithm in the
field of ADP because of its brevity and elegance (Powell, 2007). The basic idea of
AVI is to iteratively update the value function approximation that estimates the
value of being in each state.
A generic AVI algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 2. In each iteration, the algo-
rithm computes the value function estimation vˆnt and associated “greedy” action
ant by exploiting approximate value function V
n−1
t+1 in previous iteration. The esti-
mated value vˆnt is used to update the value function of being in a state according
to equation (2.7). Meanwhile, the “greedy” action ant helps to determine the next
state to visit.
The major drawback of Algorithm 2 is its lack of performance guarantee. It
can be mainly attributed to the fact that its policy updating completely relies
on previous value function approximation. As a consequence, the policy ant can
be easily misled by previous estimation, leading to an unstable performance.
Besides, the AVI algorithm is inefficient in the sense that at each iteration, it only
updates the value function approximation for those states that have been visited.
Remark: It is noteworthy that solving the optimization problem (2.6) neces-
sitates sample average approximation with inner simulation. The concept of the
post-decision state can be used to boost the efficiency of the AVI algorithm by
avoiding inner simulation (Powell, 2007).
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Algorithm 2 Generic Approximate Value Iteration
Inputs: Initial approximate value function V
0
t for t = 1, 2, · · · , T and maximum
number of iterations N .
• Step 0: Set iteration count n = 1 and Sample Initial state sn1 ;
• Step 1: Generate a sample ωnt
• Step 2: Do for t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1















Let ant be the optimal solution of problem (2.6).

















• Step 3: If n < N , set n = n+ 1 and go to step 1, otherwise return the final
value function approximation V
N
t for t = 1, 2, · · · , T
In practical applications, more often than not, the state space would be
tremendously large (or continuous). In this sense, it is impractical and prohibitive
to represent the approximate value function as a look-up table. A simple adap-
tation of using a parametric (typically linear) model to approximate the value
function has received considerable interest in literature. However, it has been
shown that the AVI algorithmic strategy using parametric approximations cannot
guarantee to converge for a general setting (Powell, 2007), unless some special
and powerful structures, like convexity, can be recognized and exploited. For
example, Nascimento and Powell (2009) developed a provably convergent ap-
proximate value iteration, named SPAR-Storage algorithm for a large scale energy
dispatch problem with a nice convex structure. Instead of directly approximat-
ing the value function, they proposed to update the slope of the value function
and utilize the property that the slope of a convex function is monotonically
increasing to boost the efficiency of the algorithm.
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Approximate Policy Iteration
An alternative powerful tool for approximate dynamic programming is approx-
imate policy iteration, which has attracted substantial research interest. The
strength of this methodology lies in its provably convergence guarantee in the
most general case (Powell, 2007). An outline of a generic version of API is pre-
sented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Generic Approximate Policy Iteration
Inputs: Initial approximate value function V pi,0t for t = 1, 2, · · · , T , inner sample
counter M and maximum number of iterations N .
• Step 0: Set iteration count n = 1 and sample initial state sn1 ;
• Step 1: Do for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M
• Step 2: Generate a sample ωmt
• Step 3: Do for t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1





















• Step 4: Initialize vˆn,mT+1 = 0 .
• Step 5: Do for t = T, T − 1, · · · , 1




t ) + γvˆ
n,m
t+1
– Step 5b: Update approximate value of current policy




V¯ n,m−1t (st) +
1
m
vˆn,mt , if st = s
n,m
t ;
V¯ n,m−1t (st), otherwise
(2.9)
• Step 6: Update value function approximation
V pi,nt (st) = (1− αn−1)V pi,n−1t (st) + αn−1V¯ n,Mt (st) (2.10)
• Step 7: If n < N , set n = n+ 1 and go to step 1, otherwise return the final
value function approximation V
pi,N
t for t = 1, 2, · · · , T
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It is worth clarifying that value function approximation is also indispensable
in approximate policy iteration, where the “policy” refers to decisions determined
by the approximate value function (see V pi,n−1t in equation (2.8)). Unlike AVI, API
algorithm attempts to obtain a statistically reliable estimation of current policy
by repeating performance evaluation process with fixed V pi,n−1t . At the end of
each iteration, the policy is updated in the form of equation (2.10).
Value function approximation using linear architectures has been widely
adopted in the context of API algorithm, mainly because of its ease of imple-
mentation. The resulting algorithm is termed as “least-squares policy iteration”
(LSPI). Several variants of LSPI algorithmic strategies have been investigated in
literature (see Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Lagoudakis and Parr, 2003; Nedic´
and Bertsekas, 2003; Xu et al., 2007). Currently, most of existing convergent
results of the proposed algorithm are established for infinite horizon MDP (see
Tsitsiklis, 2003; Ma and Powell, 2008, 2011). In the aforementioned works, the
convergence result is achieved by exploiting the monotonicity property of the dy-
namic programming operator in the context of infinite horizon MDP. To the best
of our knowledge, there exists scarce literature on convergence guarantee for a fi-
nite horizon MDP. A plausible explanation is that the absence of the monotonicity
property for the finite horizon MDP.
2.2.3 Least-Squares Monte Carlo
Least-squares Monte Carlo (LSM) approach, pioneered by Longstaff and Schwartz
(2001), is an appealing method for valuing financial derivatives with multiple
options and energy swing (and storage) contracts.
The basic idea is to approximate the optimal value function in the stochastic







where B denotes the number of selected basis functions. Ψt = (ψt1, ψt2, · · · , ψtB)
and θt = (θt1, θt2, · · · , θtB) are the set of chosen basis functions and corresponding
weight vectors, respectively. To estimate the optimal weights θt, an ordinary least-
squares regression is conducted using the performance of trajectories generated
by Monte Carlo simulation. That is why this method is named as least-squares
Monte Carlo. A generic algorithm is given below (Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4 Generic Least-Squares Monte Carlo
Inputs: Basis function Ψt for t = 1, 2, · · · , T and number of trajectories N .
• Step 0: Generate N independent trajectories of ω. For each n = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
do
• Step 1: Initialize boundary condition VT+1(sT+1) = 0 and set t = T − 1;
• Step 2: Randomly generate a state snt ∈ St, solve the optimization problem:
vt(s
n





t , at) + γE[(θt)TΨt(Ft(snt , at, ω˜t+1))|ωnt ]
}
(2.12)






t )− vt(snt ))2 (2.13)
• Step 4: If t > 1, set t = t − 1 and go to step 2, otherwise return θt for
t = 1, 2, · · · , T .
Remark: As with backward dynamic programming, LSM is also carried out
backward in time, except that it solves the optimization problem for a subset of
all states rather than loop over all states.
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) proposed this methodology to price American
options via simulation. Several illustrative examples were presented to demon-
strate the effectiveness and efficiency of the LSM method for options valuation
and risk management. Subsequently, a theoretical convergence result for the LSM
method was proved by Cle´ment et al. (2002) and Stentoft (2004).
Based on the LSM methodology described above, Meinshausen and Hambly
(2004) proposed a double-pass approximation scheme with two sets of price
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sample paths to estimate the value of a gas swing option with multiple exercise
rights. In parallel, Do¨rr (2003) developed a similar Monte Carlo simulation based
valuation framework for swing options with different features—upswings, down-
swings and penalty functions. Figueroa (2006) also extended the LSM method
to price a multiple interruptible-swing contract in the electricity market under a
more realistic price model with incorporation of jump-diffusion and seasonality.
Recently, the LSM method was adapted to valuing swing or storage contract
with volumetric flexibility (Boogert and De Jong, 2008; Boogert and de Jong,
2011; Nadarajah et al., 2013). Boogert and De Jong (2008) proposed to include
time units, discretized volume levels and price levels into the least-squares regres-
sion to reduce the dimensionality and complexity of the original problem. Later
on, this approach was extended to accommodate to the valuation of a gas storage
contract under a multi-factor mean-reverting stochastic price process (Boogert
and de Jong, 2011). The impact of different price models on contract valuation
was also investigated. In the study of Nadarajah et al. (2013), a more practical
high dimensional term structured price model was incorporated in the framework
of the valuation of energy swing contracts and storage options. A novel improved
least-squares Monte Carlo method, named LSMV, was developed to approximate
the value function using special structured basis functions. It is shown that the
proposed LSMV algorithm outperforms the traditional LSM method in terms of
better upper bound and lower bound.
2.2.4 Algorithmic Strategy Comparison
In view of the full description of the algorithmic strategies above, it would be
helpful for readers to gain a better understanding of these methods by making
a brief comparison from different aspects, as shown in Table 2.1. In particular,
through this comparison, we attempt to provide a useful guideline for practition-
ers to select suitable and applicable approaches in different contexts.
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Table 2.1: Comparison between DP, ADP and LSM
Algorithmic strategy DP LSM
ADP
AVI API
Computing sequence Backward Backward Forward Hybrid 1












Expensive Cheap Cheap Cheap







The main goal of the aforementioned methodologies is to find an adaptive policy,
which is commonly represented by a look up table in backward dynamic pro-
gramming or an approximation of the value function in ADP and LSM. However,
under certain conditions, problems might lend themselves to a “good” policy with
nice structure, which can be easily implemented in practice. For instance, a mer-
chant will order up to certain level when the inventory falls below certain target
(termed (s,S) policy) or sell a commodity when the price hits some threshold
level. In this section, we review two popular policies, base stock policy and bang
bang policy, that are commonly used in literature and practice.
2.3.1 Base Stock Policy
We start this subsection with the rigorous definition of base stock policy in Feng
et al. (2006).
Definition 2.2. A decision rule is called a base-stock policy, if there exist critical
numbers, called base-stock levels, such that the post-action inventory positions
are as close to the base-stock levels as possible. Moreover, the critical numbers
should be independent of initial inventory positions.
1Hybrid: API contains a forward optimization and backward accumulation in each iteration
as described in Algorithm 3.
2Special structure: It typically refers to convexity or concavity.
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The base stock policy has its roots in inventory management. Clark and Scarf
(1960) first showed that a base stock policy is optimal for a finite horizon peri-
odic review inventory system with stationary demand distribution in an uncapac-
itated setting. Following the pioneer work, base stock policies were modified and
generalized to accommodate inventory problems under various settings, such
as non-stationary demands (Morton, 1978), infinite horizon (Federgruen and
Zipkin, 1984) and capacity constraint (Federgruen and Zipkin, 1986).
Another stream of research associated with base stock policies discusses the
purchase decision rule for general supply contracts with quantity flexibility. Bas-
sok and Anupindi (1997) showed that the optimal procurement policy for a single
product supply contract with total minimum quantity commitment is character-
ized by a series of order-up-to levels, one for each period. The result was further
extended to multiproduct contracts with minimum dollar volume commitments
(Anupindi and Bassok, 1998). Subsequently, Bassok and Anupindi (2008) de-
veloped a general model for rolling horizon flexibility (RHF) contracts that are
commonly used in manufacturing industry to strike to balance risks faced by
suppliers and buyers. In the preceding paper, two heuristic algorithms based on
modified base stock policies were proposed for initial contract commitment and
periodic adjustment. With comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the
RHF contract and measurement of the accuracy of the advance information, the
work provided several managerial insights into the value of flexibility embedded
in the RHF contracts.
The base stock policy can also apply to energy inventory trading with stor-
age contract. The most crucial feature that distinguishes the energy inventory
trading optimization from the traditional inventory management problems is
that inventory trading decisions are made in the face of price dynamics rather
than demand uncertainty. Consequently, the resulting base stock policy is char-
acterized by stage and price dependent base stock targets. Charnes et al. (1966)
addressed a fundamental warehouse problem under price uncertainty to manage
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a commodity-based storage. They showed that the optimal policy is to empty the
storage facility if it is profitable to trade, otherwise do nothing. One major draw-
back of this study is that capacity constraints were not considered. The gap was
closed by Secomandi (2010), who investigated the optimal operational strategy
for natural gas storage trading in a capacitated setting. Under such circumstance,
it was shown that the optimal trading and operation policy is characterized by
two stage and price dependent base stock targets. Those two thresholds parti-
tion the feasible inventory space into three disjoint intervals, where different
strategies are applied. Lai et al. (2010) further extended the natural gas stor-
age valuation problem by incorporating high dimensional price term structure
model, leading to a computationally intractable dynamic programming model.
With strategic approximation of the optimal value function, a novel approximate
dynamic programming model was formulated and the optimal policy structure
was shown to persist.
2.3.2 Bang-Bang Policy
A decision rule is referred to as a bang-bang policy if the actions can only take
two values, either the minimum or the maximum of the constraints. This strategy
is popular in the literature of swing contract allocation and valuation, due to its
simplicity and convenience.
In the study of Barrera-Esteve et al. (2006), it was observed numerically that
the optimal strategy for swing contract consumption appeared to be of bang-bang
type. The authors then gave the necessary optimality conditions for such optimal
strategy and derived the consumption thresholds under different circumstances,
which are useful to determine whether and when to switch action. Bardou et al.
(2010) investigated swing contracts with firm volumetric constraints and stated
that the optimal control for swing contract allocation is generally not of bang-
bang behavior, except some special cases. They further showed that, if the global
constraints can only take integer values, there will always exist a bang-bang
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type optimal policy. In an analogous argument, Edoli et al. (2013) showed the
existence of a bang-bang optimal consumption strategy for swing contracts even
in the presence of make-up clauses.
2.4 Multi-Time Scale Markov Decision Process
There are emerging applications involving hierarchically structured sequential de-
cision making, where decisions are made at multiple time scales with a pyramid-
like hierarchical structure. Consider the employee staffing problem for a tele-
phone call center described by Gans and Zhou (2002) as an illustrative example.
At the first level (monthly or annual), the company needs to hire new employees,
because the availability for currently hired employees is subject to various condi-
tions such as downsizing, job training and absence leaving. At the second level
(daily or weekly), for given currently effective workers, the company faces the
so called “workforce scheduling” problem to dispatch employees with different
skills to different positions at different time slots in response to the stochastic
demand, work duration and budget. At the third level, the company is concerned
with a real time work assignment problem to assign stochastic incoming calls to
available employees.
Chang et al. (2003) outlined several other representative applications where
multi-time scale hierarchical decision making structure arises. These examples
indicate that hierarchical decision making is inherently embedded in many real
applications. In the context of energy supply, Sen et al. (2006) addressed a power
portfolio optimization problem for scheduling and hedging by integrating the
monthly financial contract trading decisions with the hourly unit commitment
scheduling. Furthermore, energy contract allocation is currently featured by peri-
odic constraints, take-or-pay clauses as well as make up clauses (Chiarella et al.,
2011; Edoli et al., 2013), which entails a multi-time scale model to facilitate
hierarchical structured decision making.
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In multi-level structured problems, the decisions in the higher level (slow time
scale) have an impact on the evolution of decision making process in the lower
level (fast time scale). The decisions in the lower level, in turn, do not influence
the higher level decisions directly, but the performance induced by the lower level
decision rule will serve as a single step contribution in the higher level Markov
decision process (MDP) model (Sethi and Zhang, 1994). The coupling MDP
models between different time scales in a hierarchical structure were originally
described by the interaction of performability model (corresponding to fast time
scale) and dependability model (corresponding to slow time scale) (Muppala
et al., 1996; Gosˇeva-Popstojanova and Trivedi, 2000) without taking decision
making into account.
With the incorporation of decision making into the hierarchical performability
and dependability model, Chang et al. (2003) develop an analytical multi-time
scale Markov decision process (MMDP) model. The MMDP model has paved
the way for the development of algorithms to approximately solve the resulting
large scale MMDP model. In presenting their work, the authors also proposed a
rolling horizon based heuristic method and derived an error bound to measure
the performance of the approximation algorithm. One issue is that no numerical
result is presented to validate the effectiveness of the MMDP model and the
efficiency of the rolling horizon approximation approach.
Despite the growing awareness of hierarchical structured sequential decision
making, the lack of efficient algorithms to solve the MMDP model significantly
impedes its application. The difficulty mainly stems from two aspects. Firstly, the
computational efforts exponentially increase with the problem scale, making it
intractable to solve. Secondly, it involves with a challenging decision dependent
uncertainty during the optimization process.
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2.4.1 Decision Dependent Uncertainty
In the field of decision making under uncertainty, most of the existing literature
assumes that the uncertainty is modeled as an exogenous process, which cannot
be influenced by the optimization process (see Assumption 2.1). In the real world,
however, the decision making might have a significant influence on the stochastic
process. For example, the demand of commodity on the shelf of supermarkets
highly depends on the price and inventory level (Dana Jr and Petruzzi, 2001).
From modeling perspective, Pflug (1990) was the pioneer to address this issue
of decision dependent uncertainty, in which the parameter of the underlying
probability distribution was featured by the decision variable. A measure-valued
differentiation method was presented to resolve the challenge. Later on, Goel
and Grossmann (2006) accommodated the decision dependent uncertainty in
the context of classical stochastic programming model, extending it to a more
general framework. They also proposed a Lagrangian duality based branch and
bound algorithm to solve the problem. Recently, Lee et al. (2012) utilized the
interaction between stochastic process and optimization process to develop an
iterative decision process (IDP) algorithm, which is able to learn the structure of




Short-Term Natural Gas Supply
Management
3.1 Introduction
Natural gas contracts have been widely used to manage financial risks caused by
volatile spot prices and stochastic demands, especially after the radical restructure
of the industry. With the natural gas spot price becoming increasingly volatile,
the profitability of the gas-fired GENCOs heavily relies on their ability to manage
natural gas portfolio over bilateral contract and spot trading. In this chapter, we
consider an optimization problem of dynamically allocating contracted gas over a
finite planning horizon taking into account volatile spot gas prices and stochastic
power demands.
For the past decades, there is an emerging practice-based literature on nat-
ural gas supply management and energy portfolio optimization (see Chen and
Baldick, 2007; Asif and Jirutitijaroen, 2009; Kittithreerapronchai et al., 2010;
Jirutitijaroen et al., 2013). The problems are commonly modeled as a stochastic
mixed integer linear programming (SMILP) problem and are solved by commer-
cial software such as CPLEX, without looking deep into the structure of the model.
Algorithms based on Lagrangian relaxation method and Bender’s decomposition
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have been proposed to efficiently solve the energy portfolio and generation plan-
ning problems by exploiting the structure of the optimization models (Cerisola
et al., 2009). However, it should be noted that solving the SMILP solely produces
an optimal action and corresponding performance in the current stage. But it
cannot track optimal decision making strategies for all possible states in the fol-
lowing stages. However, in practice, the GENCO bound by a specified contract
is more concerned about establishing an optimal contract delivery policy that
allows the GENCO to dynamically allocate contracted gas in response to the re-
vealed uncertainty. In order to achieve this goal, researchers proposed stochastic
dynamic programming to study contract allocation and valuation in energy (see
Jaillet et al., 2004; Løland and Lindqvist, 2008; Secomandi, 2010; Edoli et al.,
2013).
With the presence of spot trading, whether the GENCO should withdraw nat-
ural gas from the contract or not highly depends on the interaction of spot price
and remaining contract amount. Barrera-Esteve et al. (2006) proved that under
some mild assumptions, the optimal policy is of bang-bang type. That is, the op-
timal consumption amount can only take two values, either the minimum or the
maximum delivery amount. The trigger event is characterized by a price thresh-
old depending on time and inventory such that if the unfolding spot price is
higher than the price threshold, it is optimal to take the maximum consumption
amount, otherwise the minimum consumption amount is optimal. Subsequently,
Bardou et al. (2010) extended the work by presenting conditions for the exis-
tence of bang-bang optimal policy in a more general situation. Compared with
the bang-bang type policy, base stock policy appears more common (especially
in the literature of inventory management), as it does not need those critical
assumptions required for the existence of former. Secomandi (2010) showed that
the optimal inventory-trading policy for a natural gas storage facility is fully char-
acterized by two base-stock levels which only depend on stage and spot price.
Under some mild assumptions, it is found that these two stage and price de-
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pendent target levels monotonically decrease in spot prices. As with Secomandi
(2010), we also establish an optimal base stock policy for dynamic contract alloca-
tion and show the price monotonicity of our base stock levels, but in a novel way
using the theory of supermodularity (Topkis, 1998). Similarities and differences
between Secomandi (2010) and our work are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison between Secomandi (2010) and our work
Compare objective Secomandi (2010) our work
Similarity
Problem NG storage valuation or contract valuation
Model Stochastic dynamic programming
Optimal policy Base stock policy

















Another motivation for this work lies in the explanation of the strategic role of
the bilateral forward contract. It is well known that the hedging role is the reason
for the existing of forward market, which has been extensively investigated in the
field of supply chain management (Dong and Liu, 2007). Popescu and Seshadri
(2013) stated that the forward contract can help the contract holders to hedge
against the financial risks and therefore appeals to risk-averse buyers and sellers.
We, on the other hand, argue that the bilateral contract can also allow risk neutral
participants to gain profit by strategically allocating the contracted gas. The
strategic role of the forward contract here is similar to that of the storage facility
(Secomandi, 2010), enabling the buyers to time-shift the natural gas usage for
more favorable prices in the future.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we
present a detailed description of the natural gas supply management problem
for a GENCO and formulate an MDP model. The convexity of the optimal value
function is discovered and further leveraged to establish the optimal base-stock
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policy in Section 3.3. Moreover, we show that the optimal base-stock target levels
are monotonously decreasing in spot prices using the theory of supermodularity.
Section 3.4 is devoted to the description of our continuous price evolution model
and its discretization framework. In Section 3.5, results on the value of stochastic
solution are presented. We end this chapter with a brief discussion in Section
3.6.
3.2 Problem Description and Model Formulation
In this section, we study a short-term natural gas procurement of a natural gas-
fired GENCO in a deregulated market. With natural gas spot price becoming
increasingly volatile, the GENCO is exposed to substantial risk when participat-
ing in the competitive spot market. To mitigate such risk and guarantee supply
availability, the GENCO would purchase a proportion of natural gas beforehand
by engaging into a bilateral contract. The bilateral contract is a sale and purchase
agreement that specifies the total amount of gas to be delivered at a predeter-
mined price in specified future periods. The GENCO is allowed to adjust the deliv-
ery amount under certain restrictions during each period t ∈ T = {1, 2, · · · , T}.
At the terminal period T + 1, the remaining contract natural gas is assumed to
be worthless and discarded.
The sequence of events over the finite planning horizon is presented in Figure
3.1. At the beginning of the time horizon, the GENCO must specify the total
contract quantity Q and the corresponding contract price J(Q). At the beginning
of each period t, the remaining amount of contract natural gas xt is reviewed and
the natural gas spot price pt and electricity demand Dt are revealed. In view of
the one to one correspondence relationship between natural gas input and elec-
tricity output, we represent Dt as the amount of natural gas required to meet the
power demand in period t for the simplicity of model formulation. In the electric-
ity market, any committed power demand must be satisfied because unexpected
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power blackout will cause tremendous loss in industry and severe inconvenience
for household life. Due to the non-storability of electricity, over-production is dis-
couraged as well. Thanks to the day-ahead auction mechanism, power producers
can adaptively adjust their electricity production schedule to match their daily de-
mand. Therefore for each period t ∈ T , the electricity demandDt is known before
the decision making. Furthermore, the electricity demandsDt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T , are
assumed to be independent across periods and independent of the natural gas
spot prices pt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T , based on the finding that the input fuel price makes
small impacts on either short- or long- run power demand (Griffin, 1974). On the
other hand, the evolution of the spot price process is assumed to be Markovian
and independent of actions. A common way to model such price process is by
using one-factor mean-reverting model (Schwartz, 1997; Jaillet et al., 2004),
the details of which are presented in Section 3.4. We denote the range of the
remaining contract level by X = [0, Q] and the range of the electricity demand
by D = [D,D], where 0 ≤ D < D are two non-negative constants representing
the lower and upper bounds of the demand, respectively.
Figure 3.1: Planning horizon structure and sequence of events
For each period t ∈ T , with the updated information on xt, pt and Dt, the
GENCO decides the optimal amount of natural gas at to be withdrawn from the
contract. In this particular context, the delivery of natural gas requires pipeline
transportation service provided by a third party. We restrict our attention to a firm
pipeline capacity Cd, which specifies the maximum quantity of contract gas that
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can be transported through the pipeline, i.e. at ≤ Cd. In addition, the contract
withdrawal amount at is also limited by the availability of the remaining contract
gas xt. Moreover, unlike other common commodities that can be economically
stored, electricity must be used when it is generated. Hence the contract with-
drawal amount at cannot exceed the known electricity demand Dt as well. Thus
the feasible action space of at can be defined by:
At := {at ∈ <+ : 0 ≤ at ≤ min(Cd, xt, Dt)} (3.1)
Let ct(at, pt, Dt) denote the immediate cost yielded by the action at for given
pt and Dt in period t. In this problem, we only consider the gas procurement
costs by ignoring other operational costs and in-kind fuel losses. The fuel pro-
curement cost associated with the contract delivery action at is from purchasing
an additional amount (Dt − at) of gas from the spot market to meet the demand,
which can be expressed as:
ct(at, pt, Dt) := pt(Dt − at), t ∈ T , (at, pt, Dt) ∈ At ×<+ ×D (3.2)
The goal of the GENCO is to minimize the expected total gas procurement costs by
dynamically allocating the contracted gas over the finite time horizon, provided
that the total available contract amount x1 = Q is given at the beginning of
the time horizon. The goal can be achieved by solving the following stochastic
dynamic program:
VT+1(xT+1, pT+1, DT+1) = 0, (xT+1, pT+1, DT+1) ∈ X × <+ ×D (3.3)
Vt(xt, pt, Dt) = min
at∈At
pt(Dt − at) + E[Vt+1(xt − at, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)|pt]
t ∈ T ; (xt, pt, Dt) ∈ X × <+ ×D (3.4)
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In the above, Vt(xt, pt, Dt) denotes the optimal value function in period t for a
given state (xt, pt, Dt). The terminal period T +1 is introduced to express the rule
that the remaining contract natural gas is worthless and discarded at the end of
the planning horizon. We use ·˜ to denote a random variable in the rest of this
thesis.
3.3 Optimal Base Stock Policy and Monotonicity
In this section, we characterize the convexity of the optimal value function and
further derive the optimal base stock policy. Inspired by intuition, we show that
the base stock target levels are monotonously decreasing in the natural gas spot
price under some mild assumptions. For the ease of exposition, we first define
Ut(x, p) as below:
Ut(x, p) := E[Vt+1(x, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)|p˜t = p], t ∈ T , (x, p) ∈ X × <+ (3.5)
Since demand is i.i.d distributed, taking expectation in terms of Dt+1 in (3.5)
results in the independence of Ut(x, p) on Dt.
Convexity is the most basic property of the objective function Vt(xt, pt, Dt).
This is established in Proposition 3.2, followed by the proposed optimal base-
stock policy in Proposition 3.3 for the stochastic dynamic problem. Proposition
3.8 characterizes the monotonicity of the base stock target level on price pt, taking
advantage of supermodularity theory, which is introduced here to explore how
the optimal solution varies when the relevant parameter changes. At first, it is
natural to introduce Assumption 3.1, which guarantees the finite optimal function
value over all states and stages. For simplicity, we assume that Assumption 3.1
holds throughout.
Assumption 3.1. It holds that E[p˜k|p˜j = p] < ∞, j = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1, k ∈ T with
k ≥ j, and p ∈ <+, That is, the expected spot price is finite.
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Proposition 3.2 (Convexity). When Assumption 3.1 holds, Vt(xt, pt, Dt) is convex
in xt for given pt and Dt for t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1}.
Proof: The stated result follows by mathematical induction. In stage T + 1,
VT+1(xT+1, pT+1, DT+1) is trivially convex in xT+1 according to equation (3.3).
Suppose that the property holds at stages t+1, t+2, · · · , T +1. Pick any x′t+1 and
x′′t+1 in X and any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let xt+1 := λx′t+1 + (1−λ)x′′t+1, which is obviously in
X . The convexity of Vt+1(xt+1, pt+1, Dt+1) in xt+1 for given pt+1 and Dt+1 in the
hypothesis assumption implies that
Vt+1(xt+1, pt+1, Dt+1) ≤ λVt+1(x′t+1, pt+1, Dt+1) + (1− λ)Vt+1(x′′t+1, pt+1, Dt+1)
(3.6)
Taking expectation with respect to pt+1 conditioned on pt on both sides of in-
equality (3.6), we have
Ut(xt+1, pt) ≤ λUt(x′t+1, pt) + (1− λ)Ut(x′′t+1, pt) (3.7)
It implies that Ut(x, p) is also convex in x ∈ X . Now consider stage t, pick any
x′t, x
′′
t ∈ X and let a′t, a′′t ∈ At be feasible actions with respect to x′t, x′′t respectively.
Define at = λa′t + (1 − λ)a′′t , which is obviously in At, since At is a convex set.
The convexity of Ut(x, p) in x implies that
Ut(xt − at, pt) ≤ λUt(x′t − a′t, pt) + (1− λ)Ut(x′′t − a′′t , pt) (3.8)
It is clear that as the feasible action set At is convex, so is the joint feasible
inventory action set X ×At. Therefore Ut(xt−at, pt) is jointly convex in (xt, at) ∈
X × At. Note that ct(at, pt, Dt) is trivially convex in at ∈ At. It implies that the
objective function vt(xt, at, pt, Dt) := ct(at, pt, Dt)+Ut(xt−at, pt) is jointly convex
in (xt, at) ∈ X × At for given pt and Dt. Vt(xt, pt, Dt) := min
at∈At
vt(xt, at, pt, Dt) is
therefore convex in xt according to Heyman and Sobel (2004). Thus, the claimed
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property also holds in stage t, and therefore holds for all stages by the principle
of mathematical induction. 
Leveraging the convexity in Proposition 3.2, we can establish one of the core
results of this work, an optimal base stock policy, which can be easily imple-
mented in practice.
Proposition 3.3 (Optimal Base Stock Policy). There exists a base stock target
BSt(pt), which only depends on the spot price pt in the current period t, such that
the optimal contract gas withdrawal amount for any given state (xt, pt, Dt) is
a∗t (xt, pt, Dt) =

min{Cd, Dt, (xt −BSt(pt))}, if xt > BSt(pt);
0, if xt ≤ BSt(pt).
(3.9)
Proof: For any given state (xt, pt, Dt) ∈ X × <+ × D in period t ∈ T , we
consider a relaxed action by removing the withdraw capacity constraint and
demand restriction. Define xt+1 = xt − at for all relaxed action. Substituting
at = xt − xt+1 into equation (3.4) and using xt+1 as the new decision variable,
the problem is reformulated as
min
xt+1∈[0,xt]
(Dt − xt + xt+1)pt + Ut(xt+1, pt) (3.10)
Consider a particular case xt = Q. Removing the constant term, the minimization
problem (3.10) can be simplified to:
min
xt+1∈X
xt+1pt + Ut(xt+1, pt) (3.11)
It is not difficult to check that the objective function in (3.11) is convex in xt+1
and independent of the demand Dt. Denote the global optimal solution of (3.11)
by BSt(pt), which does not depend on the demand Dt as well.
We next show the structure of the optimal decision policy. Consider the opti-
mization problem (3.10) for xt ∈ (BSt(pt), Q] (see (a) in Figure 3.2). Note that
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xt+1 ∈ [0, xt] implies that BSt(pt) ∈ [0, xt], suggesting that the optimal solution
is x∗t+1 = BSt(pt). When the withdraw capacity constraint and demand restric-
tion are imposed, the optimal action is to withdraw the contract gas as much as
possible to reach the base stock level. On the other hand, when xt ∈ [0, BSt(pt)]
(see (b) in Figure 3.2), the convexity of the objective function in (3.11) implies
that this objective function is decreasing in xt+1 in the interval of [0, xt]. Hence,
the minimum solution is achieved at x∗t+1 = xt. Thus, the corresponding optimal
action is to withdraw nothing and meet all the demand by purchasing from spot
market. Therefore, the structure of the optimal base stock policy is established.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of optimal base stock policy
Proposition 3.3 implies that for any state (xt, pt, Dt) in period t, the optimal
action is to withdraw down as much as possible to the base stock target level
BSt(pt). The base stock level can be recognized as the anticipated remaining
amount of contract gas in next period. If the remaining contract level xt is higher
than the target level BSt(pt), i.e. xt > BSt(pt) it is optimal to withdraw the con-
tract gas to make the remaining contract amount as close to BSt(pt) as possible.
On the other hand, if xt ≤ BSt(pt), the remaining contract level xt itself is the
closest to the anticipated level BSt(pt). Hence the optimal action is to withdraw
nothing and meet all the demand by purchasing from spot market.
43
3.3.1 Price Monotonicity
For the ease of ensuing exposition, we first introduce several concepts in super-
modularity theory (Topkis, 1998) as below:
Definition 1 (binary relation): A binary relation  on a set X specifies for all
x′ and x′′ in X either that x′  x′′ is true or that x′  x′′ is false.
Definition 2 (partially ordered set): A partially ordered set is a set X on which
there is a binary relation  that is reflective, antisymmetric and transitive. i.e., for
all a, b and c in X, it satisfies that:
• a  a (reflexivity);
• If a  b and b  a, then a = b (antisymmetry);
• If a  b and b  c, then a  c (transitivity).
Definition 3 (join and meet): If any two elements x′ and x′′, of a partially
ordered set X have a least upper bound (greatest lowest bound) in X, it is called
their join (meet), denoted as x′ ∨ x′′(x′ ∧ x′′).
Definition 4 (lattice): A partially ordered set that contains the join and the
meet of each pair of its elements is a lattice.
Definition 5 (submodularity): Suppose that f(x) is a real-valued function on
a lattice X. If
f(x′) + f(x′′) ≥ f(x′ ∨ x′′) + f(x′ ∧ x′′)
for all x′ and x′′ in X, then f(x) is submodular on X.
Definition 6 (section): If X and T are sets, S is a subset of X × T , then the
section of S at t in T is St = {x : (x, t) ∈ S}.
Definition 7 (decreasing difference): Suppose that X and T are partially
ordered sets and f(x, t) is a real-valued function on a subset S of X × T . For t in T ,
let St denote the section of S for given t. If f(x, t′′) − f(x, t′) is decreasing in x on
St′′
⋂
St′ for all t′ ≺ t′′, then f(x, t) has decreasing differences in (x, t) in S.
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Definition 8 (stochastically increasing): Suppose that T is a subset of Rm and
{Ft(w) : t ∈ T} is a collection of distribution functions on Rn. Ft(w) is stochas-
tically increasing (decreasing) in t on T if and only if
∫
h(w)dFt(w) is decreasing
(increasing) in t on T for each decreasing real-valued function h(w) on Rn.
Remark: The definitions listed above are introduced in a general way. In our
work, however, we consider the n-dimensional real coordinate space <n. In this
specific context, the binary operation is equivalent to inequality operation. The
operation of join and meet in this context then becomes x′∨x′′ = (x′1∨x′′1, · · · , x′n∨
x′′n) and x
′∧x′′ = (x′1∧x′′1, · · · , x′n∧x′′n) for x′ = (x′1, · · · , x′n) and x′′ = (x′′1, · · · , x′′n),
where (· ∨ ·) = max(·, ·) and (· ∧ ·) = min(·, ·). Here, max and min are defined in
one single dimension.
The experience in practice tells us that a higher spot price drives the GENCO
to withdraw more gas from the engaged contract. Thus, the base stock target level
tends to be lower. Motivated by this observation, we characterize the property of
the optimal base stock level under a certain mild assumption, which is presented
below.
Assumption 3.4. The distribution of spot price p˜t+1 conditional on spot price pt,
denoted by Fpt(p˜t+1), stochastically increases in pt.
Assumption 3.4 implies that the expected spot price in the next period condi-
tional on spot price in the current stage, denoted as E[p˜t+1|pt], increases in spot
price pt in the current period (Topkis, 1998). It is consistent with our intuition
and observation in practice that if we observe a high energy spot price today, then
It is very likely that the price will remain in a high level tomorrow, if no special
events, such as financial crisis and international politics, happen.The condition
is naturally satisfied by the mean reversion model that we use in this thesis.
The inspiration of the proof for the monotone optimal solution originates from
sufficient conditions for decreasing optimal solutions on the basis of submodu-
larity, stochastically increasing and decreasing differences. With the preliminary
knowledge on the submodularity and decreasing differences, we establish three
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useful lemmas to characterize the properties of the objective function and estab-
lish the price monotonicity
Lemma 3.5. For any period t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1}, Ut(xt − at, pt) is submodular in
(xt, at) ∈ X ×At for given pt .
Lemma 3.6. For any period t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1}, Vt(xt, pt, Dt) is piecewise linear in
xt ∈ X for given pt, Dt .
Lemma 3.7. When Assumption 3.4 holds, for any period t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1},
Vt(xt, pt, Dt) has decreasing differences in (xt, pt) ∈ X × <+ for given Dt .
Figure 3.3: Illustration of price monotonicity of base stock target level
The proofs of Lemmas 3.5-3.7 are provided in Appendix A. They are then
leveraged to show the price monotonicity of the optimal base stock target level,
which is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Proposition 3.8 (Price Monotonicity). Under Assumption 3.4, the optimal base
stock target BSt(pt) decreases in the spot price pt for any period t ∈ T .
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Proof: Consider period t, pick a feasible extended inventory, action and spot
price triple (xt, at, pt) ∈ X ×At ×<+. Denote the distribution of p˜t+1 conditional




Vt+1(xt+1, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)dF (D˜t+1)dFpt(p˜t+1) (3.12)
We define V̂t+1(xt+1, pt+1) :=
∫
Vt+1(xt+1, pt+1, D˜t+1)dF (D˜t+1) for notational sim-
plicity. Lemma 3.7 implies that V̂t+1(xt+1, pt+1) also has decreasing differences in
(xt+1, pt+1). Thus, equation (3.12) becomes Ut(xt+1, pt) =
∫
V̂t+1(xt+1, p˜t+1)dFpt(p˜t+1).










t ) ∈ X × At × <+. Without loss of generality, we
assume that p′t ≤ p′′t . Then we have
Ut(x
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t − a′t) ∨ (x′′t − a′′t ), p˜t+1)− V̂t+1(x′′t − a′′t , p˜t+1))dFp′′t (p˜t+1)
=Ut((x
′
t − a′t) ∨ (x′′t − a′′t ), p′′t )− Ut(x′′t − a′′t , p′′t ) (3.13)
The first inequality holds due to the submodularity of Ut(xt − at, pt) in (xt, at),
as shown in Lemma 3.5. The second inequality follows directly from Lemma 3.7
and Corollary 3.9.1 in Topkis (1998).
Hence, by Theorem 3.10.1 in Topkis (1998), Ut(xt − at, pt) is submodular in
(xt, at, pt). It is also clear that ct(at, pt, Dt) = (Dt− at)pt is trivially submodular in
(xt, at, pt). Addition preserves submodularity in Topkis (1998), implying that the
objective function vt(xt, at, pt, Dt) = ct(at, pt, Dt)+Ut(xt−at, pt) is submodular in
(at, pt) for given xt and Dt. It follows from Theorem 2.8.2 in Topkis (1998) that
the optimal solution a∗t (xt, pt, Dt) increases in pt for given xt and Dt. Therefore
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the claimed price monotonicity of the optimal base stock target level can be
established. 
Proposition 3.8 reveals that if Assumption 3.4 holds, when the spot price pt
increases, the optimal base stock target level BSt(pt) decreases and the optimal
action a∗t (xt, pt, Dt) increases for any period t ∈ T . Not surprisingly, it is consistent
with our intuition about the behavior of the optimal base stock targets.
3.4 Price Model
In the field of finance, there exist a vast array of commodity spot price models,
among which mean reversion model has been regarded as a prime choice. This
can be attributed to its ability to reflect the economic logic that the commodity
price should be equivalent to its marginal production cost in the long term,
regardless of its short term oscillations (Laughton and Jacoby, 1995). Instead of
using the spot price itself to formulate the mean reverting process, Brennan and
Schwartz (1978) proposed to take the logarithm of the spot price as the random
variable for the ease of parameter estimation. Such mean reversion model has
been widely employed in the context of gas contract operation and valuation
(Jaillet et al., 2004; Secomandi, 2010). In this thesis, we assume that the natural
gas spot price evolves as a single-factor mean reversion model.
3.4.1 Mean Reverting Model
The evolution of logarithm of spot price Xt = ln(pt) (pt denotes spot price in
stage t) can be described by a single-factor mean reversion model (Jaillet et al.,
2004), given by a stochastic differential equation as follows:
dXt = −κ(Xt − ξ)dt+ σdWt (3.14)
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where the mean reversion rate κ, long term mean reversion level ξ and volatility
σ are assumed to be positive constants, and Wt denotes a Wiener process. The
process is also known as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
The solution of the stochastic differential equation (3.14) shows that the
logarithm of spot price Xt conditional on initial information X0 is normally dis-
tributed under risk neutral measure with mean
E(Xt|X0) = e−κtX0 + (1− e−κt)ξ (3.15)
and variance




Therefore the spot price is log-normally distributed with mean
E(pt) = exp{E(Xt|X0) + 1
2
V ar(Xt|X0)}




3.4.2 Trinomial Tree Construction
To take advantage of dynamic programming methodology, the spot price is re-
quired to be discretized via a tree-building procedure. To begin with, we intro-
duce the discrete-time expression of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in the form of
first order autoregressive (AR1) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Xt+∆t = e





where Z ∼ N(0, 1). Briefly speaking, there are two stages in the tree structure
construction. Firstly, a symmetric trinomial expanding tree is constructed for the
auxiliary random variable X∗t , where X
∗
t = Xt−ξ. The price nodes of the tree are
evenly spaced in the time horizon with an interval of ∆t and branches around
X∗ with a space of ∆X∗. Usually, ∆X∗ is set to be σ∗
√
3∆t. The advantage of this
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specified ∆X∗ selection is to reduce the approximation error to o(∆t2) (Hull and
White, 1990). Finite difference theory indicates that X∗t+∆t−X∗t is approximately
normally distributed with mean −κX∗t ∆t and variance σ2∆t.
X∗t+∆t −X∗t = (Xt+∆t − ξ)− (Xt − ξ)




∗N(0, 1)− (Xt − ξ)





≈ −κ∆tX∗t + σ
√
∆t ∗N(0, 1) (3.19)
The approximate equality in (3.19) is achieved by neglecting terms of order
higher than ∆t in Taylor expansion. For the sake of ensuing exposition, denote
the node with t = i∆t and X∗ = j∆X∗ by node (i, j). In a normal case, the
branching tree evolves by moving up one, remaining in the middle and drifting




i,j respectively. Those probabilities
can be obtained by matching the first two moments of the distribution of random
variable X∗t+∆t −X∗t .
piui,j(∆X
∗) + pidi,j(−∆X∗) = −κ∆t(j∆X∗)
piui,j[∆X
∗ + κ∆t(j∆X∗)]2 + pimi,j[κ∆t(j∆X





i,j = 1 (3.20)


















where z = κj∆t for notational simplicity. To characterize the mean reverting
property, we also incorporate another two nonstandard branching ways for ex-
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treme high and low prices. When the price is very low, the tree emanates from
node (i, j) by moving up two, moving up one and keeping straight with proba-




i,j respectively. Conversely, if the price is very high, the
tree emanates by keeping straight, drifting down one and drifting down two with




i,j respectively. We can compute the probabilities
for the nonstandard cases in a similar manner.
















− z(z + 2) pimi,j = −
1
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Secondly, shift amounts for different stages are incorporated into the symmet-
ric tree by fitting the weighted average price to the corresponding mean price









Bi,kqi+1,j(i, k) represents the probability that node (i + 1, j)
can be visited from the initial price node, and qi+1,j(i, k) is the probability to visit
node (i+ 1, j) from node (i, k).
Hence







One can refer to Jaillet et al. (2004) for more details of trinomial tree construc-
tion.
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3.4.3 Parameter Calibration and Monte Carlo Simulation
If the third term in the right hand side of (3.18) is regarded as an error term,
the equation (3.18) is simply a linear regression model. Replace Xt with ln(pt)
and run the linear regression (LR) with the 252 historical natural gas spot price
data obtained from NYMEX ranging from Jan 2 2009 to Dec 31 2009. The slope,
interception and standard deviation of the regression are denoted as k, B and S
respectively. The parameters can be computed using
e−κ∆t = k (3.25)






The estimated parameter values are displayed in Table 3.2. The R2 of the
regression is 92.8%, indicating the good linear relationship between ln(pt+1) and

















where pt is the real price at time t, while pˆt is the predicted price at time t based
on the estimated parameters and real spot price at time t− 1, for any t ∈ [2, N ].
N is the number of pairs of data we used. ν is the degrees of freedom parameter
with ν = N − n − 1, and n represents the number of parameters required to
estimate. In this case, ν = 251− 3− 1 = 247. A χ2reduced value close to one implies
that a good fit is achieved (Taylor, 1997).
Table 3.2: Calibrated parameter values for the mean reversion model
Parameter κ σ ξ
Value 0.0336 0.048 1.436
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Figure 3.4: Price sample paths and trinomial tree
In Figure 3.4, the five thick dashed lines are the randomly generated sample
paths with parameters shown in Table 3.2. The squares represent the mean price
levels for each stage. Discretized price levels are represented as the stars and the
thin solid line with diamond shows the historical series of spot price of natural
gas. Generally speaking, the discretized levels in the trinomial tree seem to be
proper that the randomly generated sample paths fluctuate around the notional
forward price and not deviate far away outside or shrink too much inside the
range of the tree branches.
Equation (3.18) can also be used in Monte Carlo simulation to randomly
generate sample paths with given parameter values and initial spot price.
Remark: There are only 252 price data in a whole year in 2009, because of no
trading in weekends and holidays. Indeed, we ignore the effect of non-business
days and assume that the 252 price data arise day by day without interruption.
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3.5 Numerical Study
In this section, we provide the computational analysis on the optimal base stock
policy and quantitatively measure the value of stochastic solution (VSS) and
discuss relevant sensitivity analysis.
3.5.1 Experimental Settings
Consider a one month short-term problem as an illustrative example. This can be
easily scaled up to a medium-term schedule problem. To numerically evaluate
the performance of the optimal base stock policy by dynamic programming in a
backward recursive fashion, discretization of the state space is necessary. In par-
ticular, the initial contract gas amount is normalized as 10 and the feasible range
of the remaining gas X is evenly discretized to 101 levels. The discretization of
the spot price follows a tree-building procedure proposed by Jaillet et al. (2004).
Moreover, the electricity demand is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed and discretized as presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Discretized demand distribution
Demand 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Probability 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.32 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.02
3.5.2 Value of Stochastic Solution
An important issue typically required to be investigated in stochastic dynamic
programming is the value of stochastic solution, the difference between the value
of the stochastic problem with incorporation of uncertainty and its deterministic
counterpart that ignores uncertainty. More precisely, in our problem, we measure
the relative value of stochastic solution (RVSS) as a percentage of cost reduction
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V E − V ∗
V ∗
=
E(xE, ω)− E(x∗, ω)
E(x∗, ω)
(3.29)
where ω denotes the uncertainty. V ∗ and V E represent the expected total cost
at the beginning of the planning horizon by the optimal base stock policy and a
heuristic policy, respectively. The heuristic policy makes decisions by assuming
that the price evolution is deterministic, i.e. ignoring the price uncertainty in
the future. The price uncertainty can be measured by the volatility parameter σ
in the mean reversion model, since it approximately equals to the coefficient of
variation of the spot price. When σ = 0, we can obtain a so-called “no-volatility”
policy, which only considers the expectation value for the spot price in the future.
Figure 3.5: Effect of price volatility and withdraw capacity on V SS
We quantify the effect of the withdrawal capacity Cd and the price volatility
σ on the value of stochastic solution (VSS) and its components—V ∗ and V E
in Figures 3.5-3.6. As can be seen from Figure 3.5, the performance of “no-
volatility” policy is not bad when the price volatility σ is low. It is remarkable
that its performance is at most 1.5% from the optimum when σ = 0.05. In this
situation, the “no-volatility” policy can be used to approximate the optimal cost.
However, the performance worsens as price volatility increases. Note that the
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Figure 3.6: Effect of price volatility and withdraw capacity on V ∗ and V E
error can reach up to a level of 5.7% when σ = 0.2, indicating that it is meaningful
to take price uncertainty into consideration when the price volatility σ is high.
The result coincides with the finding in Berling and Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz (2011).
For a fixed price volatility, the RVSS increases in the withdraw capacity Cd. It is
probably due to the fact that larger withdraw capacity offers more flexibility to
deliver the contract gas, yielding a better performance of the optimal base stock
policy with less constraint imposed on the action.
Figure 3.6 shows that the optimal expected total cost V ∗ first decreases and
then increases in the price volatility σ for given withdraw capacity. It may account
for the coexistence of two forces acting on the performance of V ∗ when σ varies.
Firstly, a higher price volatility σ leads to a higher expected future price, as
implied by the property of the mean reversion model, which drives the cost up.
Secondly, a highly volatile spot market enables the company to cut down cost by
withdrawing contract gas when the spot price is high and purchasing from spot
market if the price is low. The result indicates that the latter force dominates
the former one when the price volatility σ is small. But as the price variation σ
increases, the impact of price growth prevails. For given price uncertainty, the
V ∗ first decreases in the withdraw capacity Cd and then levels off. This can
be attributed to the fact that when the withdraw capacity is high enough, the
constraint enforced on the action is negligible.
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The trend analysis for V E is analogous with that for V ∗, except that the V E
is monotonously increasing in the price volatility σ. It can be explained by the
fact that the “no-volatility” policy does not take action to react to the spot price
realization, which disables the latter impact of spot price variation. Hence the
expected total cost would increase with the growing price volatility.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we investigated a stochastic dynamic problem on natural gas
supply portfolio of forward contract and spot procurement in a deregulated en-
vironment. The problem was modeled as a multistage Markov decision process.
It was shown that a stage and price dependent base stock policy is optimal for
dynamically allocating contracted gas over the planning horizon. The resulting
policy is attractive in the sense that it provides a useful guideline for the GENCO
to make contract delivery decision strategically. Moreover, using the theory of
supermodularity, we proved that the optimal base stock target levels monotoni-
cally decrease with spot prices, which is in agreement with our intuition. With
the help of an appropriate discretized price trinomial tree, the optimal base stock
levels can be easily computed. In the numerical experiments, we showed that
when the price process exhibits low volatility, a suboptimal “no-volatility” policy
can be exploited to approximate the optimal policy. However, if the spot market
becomes more volatile, there is substantial value for the GENCO to take price
volatility into account.
As discussed above, the natural gas contract allows the GENCO to reduce its
fuel supply cost via interaction with the spot market, especially in a substantially
volatile market. Then the following questions arise naturally: what is the value of
the contract and how much would the GENCO be willing to pay for the contract




Contract Negotiation and Price
Determination
4.1 Introduction
Traditionally, natural gas trade is completed by long-term forward contracts
to support supplier’s infrastructure investment. However, International Energy
Agency reports that long-term contracts fail to deliver the transparency and in-
formation required in the increasingly competitive natural gas market (Juris,
1998a; Jensen, 2011). Hence medium- and short- term contracts become more
and more popular in natural gas trading market because of their flexibility. These
contract transactions are mainly completed by bilateral negotiation, allowing the
contracting parties to engage into the contracts that suit for their needs. During
the negotiation process, one of the essential issues for both contracting parties is
how to determine the optimal price of the bilateral contract. As a rule of thumb,
natural gas spot price is commonly chosen as a benchmark for bilateral contract
trading, since it reflects the short run marginal cost in a competitive market (Ju-
ris, 1998a). However, the spot price index may not accurately reflect the value of
the contract, as it fails to account for future price and demand uncertainties. In
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this chapter, we aim to develop a novel contract pricing scheme based on contract
valuation in the presence of spot trading.
This chapter closely relates to the literature on contract pricing (see Bjorgan
et al., 2000; Gabriel et al., 2006; Palamarchuk, 2012). Bjorgan et al. (2000)
proposed to apply the no-arbitrage pricing principle to determine a reasonable
contract price. They concluded that the arbitrage-free contract price for a risk-
neutral decision maker is equivalent to the expected value of the contract deriving
from its own operational strategy. However, the contract delivery schedule deter-
mined by one party would probably be unacceptable to the other one in reality.
This phenomenon stimulates bilateral negotiation for the contracting parties to
reach an agreement. Palamarchuk (2012) suggested both parties to find their
own acceptable contract price range, followed by concluding a mutually accept-
able contract price via negotiation. He proposed to solve an auxiliary SMILP
problem to compromise the contract scheduling so that both parties can obtain
relative benefits from the contract. Gabriel et al. (2006) investigated the con-
tract price and quantity determination for an electric retailer taking into account
the settlement risks from both contracting sides. Unlike the SMILP model in the
aforementioned works, we formulate the problem as a SDP. With incorporation
of contract valuations from both contracting parties, we show that there is al-
ways a possibility for the contracting parties to negotiate and reach a mutually
acceptable contract price.
In practice, the bilateral contract is typically concluded by compromising and
negotiating, which necessitates game theory for mathematical analysis. Dong and
Liu (2007) considered pricing a forward contract of a nonstorable commodity for
risk-averse decision makers. The study provided managerial insights on the equi-
librium contract price and quantity via an asymmetric Nash bargaining model.
Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) studied an optimization problem of pricing a forward
contract in a competitive market involving one buyer and multiple sellers in the
presence of spot trading. It was shown that the resulting optimal contract price
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is characterized by a Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium. Similarly, Popescu and Seshadri
(2013) developed a game theory framework that involves multiple risk-neutral
producers competing in the forward and spot market. The work shed light on the
impact of demand uncertainty on commodity contracting. Note that the afore-
mentioned works mainly focus on providing a managerial insight into contract
negotiation through a simplified one-stage problem. We extend these work to
price a contract in the context of a more general multi-period scheduling. In this
chapter, we propose a Nash bargaining model to determine the optimal contract
quantity and corresponding price by incorporating the contract valuations for
both the GENCO and the gas supplier, which can be evaluated by solving the
multi-stage MDP models separately.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as below. In Section 4.2, the val-
ues of the bilateral contract for the GENCO and the natural gas supplier are
evaluated using MDP models, respectively. We provide a detailed analysis on
the relationship of these two valuations and present a Nash bargaining model to
price the bilateral contract and determine the corresponding optimal quantity to
engage simultaneously in Section 4.3. Several numerical results under various
market conditions are presented in Section 4.4 to demonstrate the feasibility of
the proposed pricing framework. We also examine the impact of the spot price
volatility on the optimal contract quantity. In Section 4.5, we close this chapter
by a short discussion.
4.2 Contract Valuation
Recall that the optimal base stock target levels BSt(pt) can be easily computed by
solving the MDP with an appropriate price scenario tree, as illustrated in Section
3.5. Once the optimal base stock levels BSt(pt) for all discretized price levels
are computed, we can directly obtain the optimal decision a∗t (xt, pt, Dt) for any
specified price and demand sample paths. Thus, the value of the contract for
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the GENCO can be approximated via sample average approximation. However,
this approach must resort to Monte Carlo simulation to generate spot price and
demand sample paths, giving rise to unnecessary estimation errors. In this section,
we propose an alternative way to evaluate the value of the contract for the
GENCO and the gas supplier, respectively.
4.2.1 Contract Valuation for the GENCO
In addition to the method mentioned above, we can alternatively derive the value
of the contract Jm(Q) for the risk-neutral GENCO directly from the Bellman’s
equation in (3.3)-(3.4). Note that Jm(Q) is the price that the GENCO has to pay
for the Q amount of contract gas. In addition to the contract payment Jm(Q),
the GENCO also needs to purchase additional gas from the spot market to meet
the demand, incurring expected total spot procurement cost V1(Q, p1, D1) related
to the Q amount of contract. Note that when Q = 0, V1(0, p1, D1) denotes the
total expected procurement cost without entering into any contract. Hence the
expected total natural gas acquisition costs for the GENCO with and without the
contract can be expressed as V1(Q, p1, D1) + Jm(Q) and V1(0, p1, D1), respectively.
As a risk-neutral decision maker, the GENCO is indifferent between these two
options as long as V1(Q, p1, D1) + Jm(Q) = V1(0, p1, D1), despite the fact that the
latter choice is much riskier. Hence, by incorporating the MDP model (3.3)-(3.4),
Jm(Q) can be expressed as
Jm(Q) = Vˆ1(Q, p1, D1) (4.1)
where
Vˆt(xt, pt, Dt) = max ptat + E[Vˆt+1(xt − at, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)|pt]
s.t. 0 ≤ at ≤ min(Dt, Cd, xt) (4.2)
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VˆT+1(xT+1, pT+1, DT+1) = 0 (4.3)
The expression of Jm(Q) above implies that the contract valuation with respect
to the GENCO is equivalent to the maximum profit that the GENCO can earn by
reselling the contract back to the spot market. Hence, it can serve as a benchmark
for contract selection, measuring whether it is profitable for the GENCO to engage
into the contract or not. To ensure that both contracting parties may gain benefit
by entering into the contractual relationship, we also need another benchmark
Js(Q), the minimum price that the gas supplier would offer for the contract. The
value of the contract Js(Q) in terms of the gas supplier can be formulated in a
similar way, which necessitates analysis on the gas supplier’s operation.
4.2.2 Contract Valuation for the Gas Supplier
In order to assess the value of the bilateral contract Js(Q) with respect to the
gas supplier, we investigate the natural gas supply operation for the gas supplier
who owns a wellhead or liquified natural gas to produce natural gas. In addition,
the gas supplier can also purchase natural gas from spot market to supply the
bilateral contract or sell the produced natural gas in the spot market to gain
benefit. Similar to the GENCO, the supplier also faces substantial price risk in the
deregulated natural gas market. Hence, the gas supplier is also willing to enter
into a bilateral contract specifying total Q amount of gas to be delivered over
the planning horizon, which is the same as the one presented in Figure 3.1. It is
noteworthy that the gas supplier has the obligation to supply the total Q amount
of contract gas in the planning horizon, but it has the priority to schedule the
contract delivery volume in each period that the GENCO has to accept. In other
words, the supplier’s contract allocation decision in each period is assumed to be
independent of the requirement from the GENCO. The underlying justification
for this assumption is twofold: Firstly, Js(Q) reflects the minimum price that the
GENCO can offer, which should only depend on the supplier’s own operational
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strategy. Thus, the supplier can decide whether it is profitable to engage into
the contract or not. Once the contract price offered by the GENCO is higher
than Js(Q), the supplier can gain benefit from the contract. Secondly, if it is
compulsory for the supplier to supply the contract gas required by the GENCO, it
turns out that Js(Q) will coincide with Jm(Q). Therefore, the supplier’s delivery
schedule is assumed to be independent of the contract allocation strategy of the
GENCO.
At the beginning of period t, based on the information of the updated re-
maining contract amount xt and revealed gas spot price pt, the supplier decides
the amount of natural gas qt to be produced and contract gas amount ast to be
delivered, simultaneously. The superscript s is used to distinguish from GENCO’s
action at. Similar to the physical delivery constraint for the GENCO, the contract
delivery decision ast is also restricted by the capacity Cd of the pipeline network
and the availability of the remaining contract amount xt. In addition, the produc-
tion action qt is restricted by the production capacity Cp of the supplier, which
is a positive constant. Therefore, the feasible action set for the joint decisions qt
and ast is
Qt ×Ast = {(qt, ast) : 0 ≤ qt ≤ Cp, 0 ≤ ast ≤ min(Cd, xt)}. (4.4)
The joint decisions qt and ast yield an immediate production cost lt(qt), which only
relies on the production level qt, and an additional cost of purchasing (ast − qt)
amount of gas from the spot market, which can be expressed as cst(a
s
t , qt, pt) =
pt(a
s
t − qt). Note that cst(ast , qt, pt) can be negative when ast < qt, meaning the
profit of selling extra (qt − ast) amount of produced gas to the spot market.
Let Rt(xt, pt) denote the optimal value function for given xt and pt for any
period t ∈ T . In the terminal period T + 1, a positive remaining contract amount
will incur an infinity penalty (or a sufficiently large penalty cost), forcing the gas





0, if xT+1 = 0;
+∞, if xT+1 > 0.
(4.5)
For any period t ∈ T , the optimal value function Rt(xt, pt) can be defined by the
Bellman’s equation in a recursive way:




t − qt) + E[Rt+1(xt − ast , p˜t+1)|pt]
t ∈ T ; (xt, pt) ∈ X × <+ (4.6)
It is worth mentioning that the explicit form of the production cost lt(qt) is not
required in the context of contract valuation, as it will not affect the value of the
contract Js(Q). This can be attributed to the definition of Js(Q), which resembles
that of Jm(Q). More specifically, the value of the contract Js(Q) can be expressed
by R1(Q, p1)−R1(0, p1), the benefit that the supplier can gain from the contract.
We have
Js(Q) = Rˆ1(Q, p1) (4.7)
where
Rˆt(xt, pt) = min pta
s
t + E[Rˆt+1(xt − ast , p˜t+1)|pt]
s.t. 0 ≤ ast ≤ min(Cd, xt) (4.8)
RˆT+1(xT+1, pT+1) =

0, if xT+1 = 0;
+∞, if xT+1 > 0.
(4.9)
Remark: The definition of Js(Q) implies that the value of the contract Js(Q)
with respect to the supplier is equivalent to minimizing the expected total cost
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by purchasing from the spot market to supply the contract. This result is in
agreement with the finding in Bjorgan et al. (2000).
4.3 Contract Price Determination
With the knowledge of contract value-quantity curves Js(Q) and Jm(Q), it is now
possible for the contracting parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable price as
long as Js(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) holds for some nontrivial Q. We are therefore interested
in the relationship between Js(Q) and Jm(Q).
4.3.1 Relationship Between Jm(Q) and Js(Q)
In practice, due to the limited physical delivery capacity Cd, the compromised
contract amount cannot exceed Qmax = CdT . Consider a special case where
Q = Qmax. From the GENCO’s point of view, it is probably that the Qmax amount
of contract gas cannot be used up at the end of the planning horizon because of
demand uncertainty. Hence, the GENCO prefers to commit as much contract gas
as possible for delivery in each period since the remaining unused contract gas
at the end of the time horizon is worthless and discarded. From the supplier’s
perspective, there is no choice but to deliverCd amount in each period. Otherwise,
it is impossible for the supplier to fulfill the stipulated Qmax amount of contract




pt min(Dt, Cd, xt)] ≤ E[
T∑
t=1
ptCd] = Js(Qmax) (4.10)
where x1 = Q, xt = Q −
t−1∑
τ=1
min(Dτ , Cd, xτ ) for t = 2, · · · , T . Based on the
definition of Js(Q) and Jm(Q), it is not difficult to show that Jm(Q) is concave in
Q and Js(Q) is convex inQ. Accordingly, Jm(Q)−Js(Q) is concave inQ. Concavity
of Jm(Q) − Js(Q), together with Jm(0) = Js(0) = 0 and Jm(Qmax) ≤ Js(Qmax),
implies that there are only two possible scenarios in terms of the relationship
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between Jm(Q) and Js(Q): either Jm(Q) < Js(Q) for all Q ∈ (0, Qmax) or there
exists a Qˆ ∈ (0, Qmax) such that Js(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) holds for 0 ≤ Q ≤ Qˆ and Js(Q) ≥
Jm(Q) holds for Qˆ < Q ≤ Qmax. In the former case, it is evident that never will
the two parties reach an agreement. The latter scenario is more desirable, since
it is possible for the two parties to negotiate and achieve an equilibrium solution.
The following proposition clarifies the relationship between these two contract
value-quantity curves Jm(Q) and Js(Q).
Proposition 4.1. There exists a Qˆ ∈ (0, Qmax) such that Js(Qˆ) = Jm(Qˆ). For all
0 ≤ Q < Qˆ, Js(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) and for all Qˆ < Q ≤ Qmax, Js(Q) ≥ Jm(Q).
Proof: To prove that the stated property is true, it suffices to show that there
exists a Q˜ ∈ (0, Qmax) such that Js(Q˜) ≤ Jm(Q˜).
Consider a naive policy that the GENCO withdraws the contract gas as much
as possible from the very beginning until it is used up and thereafter it purchases
from the spot market to meet the demand regardless of price fluctuation. i.e.
at(xt, Dt) = min(Dt, Cd, xt) (4.11)
where x1 = Q, xt = Q −
t−1∑
τ=1
min(Dτ , Cd, xτ ) for t = 2, · · · , T . Denote the corre-
sponding value of the bilateral contract under this policy as JNaive(Q). It is not
difficult to check that the naive policy is always a feasible policy for the GENCO
to allocate the contract gas. Hence JNaive(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) for all Q ∈ [0, Qmax].
Now assume that the gas supplier delivers the exact amount of contract gas
ordered by the GENCO. That is, it implements the same naive policy as presented
above. To ensure that the naive policy is also feasible for the supplier, great
care need to be taken with respect to the bound condition in (4.9). Consider a
particular case with contract size Q˜ =
T∑
t=1
min[D,Cd, xt], where D is the lower
limit of revealed electricity demand. For the sake of nontriviality, we assume that
not all demand can be zero if D = 0. Under this assumption, it is clear that
Q˜ ∈ (0, Qmax) and xT+1 = Q˜−
T∑
τ=1
min(Dτ , Cd, xτ ) ≤ 0. This indicates that for all
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possible realizations of Dt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T , the specified contract volume Q˜ would
be completely supplied without incurring the infinite penalty at the end of the
planning horizon. It is not difficult to check that the naive policy is also feasible
for the gas supplier if Q ∈ (0, Q˜]. That is, JNaive(Q) ≥ Js(Q) holds for Q ∈ (0, Q˜].
Therefore, Js(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) holds for Q ∈ [0, Q˜].
Also bear in mind that Jm(Q) and Js(Q) are trivially continuous in Q and
Jm(Qmax) ≤ Js(Qmax). It follows from the intermediate value theorem that there
exists a Qˆ ∈ (Q˜, Qmax) such that Js(Qˆ) = Jm(Qˆ).
Fix a scalar λ ∈ [0, 1] and let Q = λQˆ, Q ∈ [0, Qˆ]. Concavity of Jm(Q)− Js(Q)
implies that
Jm(Q)− Js(Q) ≥ (1− λ)(Jm(0)− Js(0)) + λ(Jm(Qˆ)− Js(Qˆ)) = 0 (4.12)
Therefore, we can conclude that Js(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) holds for all 0 ≤ Q < Qˆ. Simi-
larly, we can show that Js(Q) ≥ Jm(Q) holds for all Qˆ < Q ≤ Qmax. 
The shadow region in Figure 4.1 represents the feasible set of the (Q, J) combi-
Figure 4.1: Illustration of contract value and Pareto set I
nations, I = {(Q, J) : 0 ≤ Q ≤ Qmax, Js(Q) ≤ J(Q) ≤ Jm(Q)}. Proposition 4.1
demonstrates that the feasible set I is non-empty, within which the contracting
parties can negotiate to reach a mutually acceptable (Q, J) pair.
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4.3.2 Nash Equilibrium
The study on Nash bargaining problem can be dated back to Nash’s pioneer contri-
butions on non-cooperative games in the 1950s (Nash, 1950, 1951). It aimed to
find a Pareto efficient solution, also known as Nash equilibrium, such that it is im-
possible to improve any individual’s gain without deteriorating other individuals’
gain. Characterized by several axioms, various models for such equilibrium have
been proposed, as can be seen in a survey by Roth (1979) and references therein.
Nash (1953) proposed a maximum Nash product method to yield a unique Nash
equilibrium based on two classical axioms and three additional Nash axioms.
Furthermore, the asymmetric version of the Nash bargaining problem was ad-
dressed by introducing the so-called “bargaining power” to capture the unequal
positions of the contracting parties in the negotiation process (Binmore et al.,
1986; Dong and Liu, 2007). In this subsection, we model the negotiation process
as an asymmetric Nash bargaining game and show the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium of the Nash bargaining model.
Consider a feasible contract quantity price combination (Q, J) ∈ I. We de-
note by Jm(Q)−J(Q) and J(Q)−Js(Q) the utilities that the GENCO and the gas
supplier can gain from the bilateral contract, respectively. By introducing the ne-
gotiation powers µ, µ ∈ [0, 1], we modify the utility functions to characterize the
asymmetric bargain powers of the contracting parties. In the bargaining process,
we aim to select an optimal (Q, J) combination within the feasible region I so
that the total augmented utility gained from the bilateral contract is maximized:
max
(Q,J)∈I
(Jm(Q)− J(Q))µ(J(Q)− Js(Q))1−µ (4.13)
Proposition 4.2 below establishes the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
of the Nash bargaining game.
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Proposition 4.2. There exists a unique equilibrium (Q∗, J∗) for the Nash bargain-
ing game, where
Q∗ = argmaxQ(Jm(Q)− Js(Q)) (4.14)
J∗(Q∗) = µJs(Q∗) + (1− µ)Jm(Q∗) (4.15)
Proof: Define the objective function
f(J,Q) = (Jm(Q)− J(Q))µ(J(Q)− Js(Q))1−µ (4.16)
Then the partial derivative of f(J,Q) on J is
∂f(J,Q)
∂J
= −µθ1−µ + (1− µ)θ−µ (4.17)
where θ = J(Q)−Js(Q)
Jm(Q)−J(Q) . According to the first order condition, we obtain that
(1− µ)(Jm(Q)− J∗(Q)) = µ(J∗(Q)− Js(Q)) (4.18)
which is equivalent to
J∗(Q) = µJs(Q) + (1− µ)Jm(Q) (4.19)
The second partial derivative of f(J,Q) on J is
∂2f(J,Q)
∂J2
= −µ(1−µ)(Jm(Q)−Js(Q))2(Jm(Q)−J(Q))µ−2(J(Q)−Js(Q))−µ−1 ≤ 0
(4.20)
Hence J∗(Q) is the unique global optimal solution for the Nash bargaining model









Hence the optimal contract quantity is
Q∗ = argmaxQ(Jm(Q)− Js(Q)) (4.22)
and the corresponding optimal contract price is
J∗(Q∗) = µJs(Q∗) + (1− µ)Jm(Q∗) (4.23)
The resulting unique Nash equilibrium solution may shed light on the strategy
of bilateral contract negotiation. First of all, the optimal contract quantity can
be easily obtained by examining the gap between those two contract valuations
Jm(Q) − Js(Q), which is independent of negotiation power µ. In addition, the
optimal contract price is a weighted average of those two contract valuations,
using the bargaining powers as the corresponding weight coefficients. Further-
more, the result also implies that one’s augmented utility gain is proportional to
its negotiation power. Most importantly, the optimal contract quantity and price
can be determined separately in sequence during the contract negotiation. This
strategy is easy to implement in practice, which might contribute to significantly
simplifying the negotiation process.
4.4 Numerical Experiments
The experiment settings we used in this section are the same as those in Section
3.5. Under these settings, we examine the feasibility of the proposed pricing
framework in Section 4.4.1 and the impact of price volatility on optimal contract
quantity and price in Section 4.4.2.
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4.4.1 Optimal Contract Price and Price Indexes
In a competitive natural gas market, the spot price reflects the short-run marginal
production cost because of the fundamentals of supply and demand. Hence, it
commonly serves as a benchmark for pricing a bilateral forward contract (Ju-
ris, 1998a). On the other hand, the long-term marginal production cost can be
captured by the mean reverting price level (Jaillet et al., 2004), which can be
used as another benchmark for the optimal bilateral contract price. Therefore, we
are interested in the relationship between the optimal contract price and price
indexes (both the spot price and the mean reverting price). In this experiment,
we consider two scenarios: The evolving price process is expected to increase in
the future and its counterpart case.
Figure 4.2: Contract valuation and price indexes
Figure 4.2 presents the relationship between the optimal contract price and
the price indexes with respect to the increasing price process (left panel) and the
decreasing price process (right panel). The filled triangle denotes the optimal
contract price and quantity combination with µ = 0.5. The hexagram denotes the
adjusted optimal contract price with µ = 0.4 (or µ = 0.6). The dotted line and
dash line represent current spot price and long-term mean reverting price level,
respectively.
When the price process is expected to increase in the near future (left panel),
the GENCO prefers to lock part of its fuel source by entering into a bilateral con-
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tract. The gas supplier, in contrast, would like to hold the gas for more favorable
price in the future. In other words, the gas supplier is reluctant to engage into
a contractual relationship unless the GENCO can offer an appealing price for
the contract. In this sense, the gas supplier should possess a higher negotiation
power in the bargaining process, i.e., 1− µ > µ. Proposition 4.2 implies that the
compromised contract price J∗ in this case (µ < 0.5) should be higher than that
with symmetric negotiation power (µ = 0.5), which is close to the current spot
price. Therefore the compromised contract price would be a little higher than
the current spot price, which is consistent with our intuition in reality.
In the case of decreasing price, the GENCO prefers to purchase from the
spot market to satisfy its demand in each period. In contrast, the gas supplier
is willing to enter into the bilateral contract to secure its revenue. Therefore,
the power generation company takes a favorable position in the negotiation
process, i.e. µ > 0.5. Twofold implications can be deduced in this scenario. First
of all, never would the contract be concluded at a price higher than the current
spot price, because such an unattractive contract does not appeal to the GENCO.
The supplier, on the other hand, might compromise as it needs to engage into
a contractual relationship to protect against the decreasing price. Although the
contract price is lower than the short-term marginal production cost, it can gain
profit and cover financial loss by purchasing from the spot market to supply the
contract in the future. Therefore, it is possible for the contracting parties to reach
an agreement on a contract price lower than the current spot price. Secondly, the
negotiated contract price should be higher than the long-term mean reverting
price level, as shown in the right panel of Figure 4.2. As the expected spot price in
the future monotonically decreases to the long-term mean reverting price level,
it is not profitable for the supplier to accept a contract price, which is lower than
its long-term marginal production cost.
Overall, the results presented above validate the feasibility of our contract
pricing determination model.
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4.4.2 Contract Price Determination
In this experiment, we set µ = 0.5, meaning that the contracting parties have
symmetric negotiation powers. Figure 4.3 displays the contract value-quantity
Figure 4.3: The contract value-quantity curves for different spot price variations
curves Jm(Q) and Js(Q) under different spot price variations. It can be seen
that Jm(Q) would increase as the spot price variation σ goes up. The result
indicates that the bilateral contract allows the GENCO to gain more benefits from
dynamically allocating contracted gas, when the spot market is more volatile. This
can be attributed to the strategic role of the bilateral contract which enables the
GENCO to time-shift natural gas usage for more favorable prices in the future. On
the other hand, Js(Q) would decrease in the spot price variation σ when the total
contract quantity Q is not very large, whereas it increases in σ when Q is large.
This can probably be explained by the definition of Js(Q) in (4.7)-(4.9), which
implies that Js(Q) is equivalent to the minimum expected cost by purchasing
from the spot market to supply the contract. When the contract amount Q is not
very much, the supplier can manage its contract delivery schedule strategically
to gain benefit. However when the stipulated contract quantity Q is very large
(for example, Q > 11), the gas supplier has to purchase from the spot market
to supply the contract in certain periods even if the spot price is very high in
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those periods. This might be a possible explanation for the unexpected increase
of Js(Q) for large contract volume Q when the spot price variation σ increases.
As also shown in Figure 4.3, for a fixed spot price variation σ, those two
contract value-quantity curves Jm(Q) and Js(Q) will intersect with each other,
which further confirms Proposition 4.1. This phenomenon can be attributed to
the demand uncertainty embedded in the decision making process. Specifically,
because of the demand uncertainty, it is likely that the stipulated contract amount
Q cannot be used up, especially for a large contract volume Q. As the remaining
contract amount unused at the end of the planning horizon is worthless, the
value of the contract Jm(Q) for the GENCO is actually computed only by a part
of the total specified contract volume. On the other hand, the supplier must
supply the stipulated contract quantity Q over the time horizon, regardless of the
demand uncertainty. The corresponding value of the contract Js(Q) is therefore
evaluated based on the total contract amount Q. Not surprisingly, Jm(Q) would
be smaller than Js(Q) when Q is very large. Combining with an obvious fact that
Js(Q) ≤ Jm(Q) holds for small stipulated contract amount Q, we can conclude
that these two curves will cross each other somewhere.
The shapes of those two curves Jm(Q) and Js(Q) indicate that it is always
possible for both parties to negotiate and reach an agreement on a mutually
acceptable contract price and quantity. The effect of the spot price variation σ on
the optimal contract quantity Q∗ yielded by those two curves are shown in the
left panel of Figure 4.4. As can be seen, the optimal contract quantity Q∗ would
first increase and then decrease with the increasing spot price variation σ. This
is because when the spot market fluctuates a lot, it is with high probability to
reveal a high or low spot price. Under this circumstance, both parties are inclined
to expand the compromised contract volume to gain more profits. However, if
the spot price becomes extremely volatile, Js(Q) will increase as explained above.
As a result, the gas supplier prefers not to engage too much in the bilateral
contract. Therefore, in the case of extreme volatile spot market, the optimal
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contract quantity Q∗ declines when spot price variation σ grows. The trend and
analysis of the optimal contract price is similar to that of optimal contract quantity,
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Figure 4.4: The optimal contract price and quantity for different spot price varia-
tions
The similarity trend between the optimal contract price and quantity might be
attributed to the fact that increasing optimal contract quantity directly leads to
higher optimal contract price. Motivated by this observation, we are interested in
the optimal unit contract price, the ratio between the optimal contract price and
corresponding quantity. As shown in the right panel of Figure 4.4, the optimal
unit contract price J∗/Q∗ is decreasing in the negotiation power µ in a linear
fashion, as indicated by Proposition 4.2. In addition, the optimal unit contract
price J∗/Q∗ is increasing in the spot market variation σ when µ < 0.5. A plausible
explanation is that by equation (4.19), Jm(Q) is the dominant factor to influence
the optimal contract price in this case. On the contrary, if µ > 0.5, the GENCO
takes the advantageous position in the bargaining process, squeezing the optimal
contract price as low as possible. That is, the optimal contract price is more
influenced by Js(Q). Notice that the optimal contract quantity is not very large,
as shown in Figure 4.3. Therefore, the optimal unit contract price J∗/Q∗ increases
in spot price variation σ for a low µ value and decreases in spot price variation
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for a high µ value, since Jm(Q) increases in the spot price variation σ and Js(Q)
decreases with the increase of σ when Q is not very large, as presented above.
4.5 Chapter Summary
The primary objective of this chapter was to develop a novel framework to price
a bilateral gas contract for a GENCO accounting for volatile spot prices. To assess
the value of the contract, we investigated a stochastic natural gas supply man-
agement problem, upon which the profitability of the GENCO heavily relies. By
incorporating the contract valuations for both the GENCO and the supplier, we
showed that there is always a possibility that the contracting parties can negoti-
ate to reach a mutually acceptable contract price. Taking the bargaining power
into consideration, the contract negotiation process was modeled as an asym-
metric Nash bargaining game. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
solution suggested that the optimal contract quantity and price can be separately
determined in sequence in the bargaining process. It was also revealed that the
optimal contract quantity does not depend on the bargain power and the optimal
contract price is a weighted average of the contract valuations, which is further
confirmed by our computational studies. We also examined that the spot price
variation plays an important role in the contract pricing framework. In particu-
lar, we showed that the optimal contract quantity is nonmonotonic in spot price




Multi-time Scale Markov Decision
Process for Natural Gas Contract
Allocation and Valuation
5.1 Introduction
In traditional natural gas industry, many contracts have been designed to cover
gas delivery for multiple years up to decades and offer contractual flexibility of
delivery within certain constraints. In general, the variable daily contract de-
livery amount is restricted by specified minimum and maximum daily delivery
amount, due to limited physical transportation capacity. In addition, minimum
and maximum annual delivery constraints are imposed on the cumulative con-
tract withdrawal quantity for each contractual year. Moreover, at the end of each
year, the buyer is forced to pay a minimum annual volume of contracted gas
(termed as take-or-pay gas), regardless of whether it is actually taken or not. The
take-or-pay quantity is commonly set as a percentage of the maximum annual
delivery quantity. A properly designed take-or-pay clause provides an insurance
mechanism for the seller to secure its revenue stream and cover its capital invest-
ment. On the other hand, it also provides the buyer an incentive to make full use
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of the contract as much as possible. However, the buyer has to undertake the risk
of paying gas that is not actually taken because of demand uncertainty.
In recent years, make up clauses arise to mitigate such demand risk from the
buyer’s perspective. The emerging make up clauses enable the contract buyers
to bank the take-or-pay gas that has been paid for but not taken yet, and carry
it over to the subsequent year. Those contracted gas in the make up bank is
not available for reclaim until the cumulative contract delivery amount exceeds
the take-or-pay level (or predetermined reference level). The make up clauses
create an opportunity for the buyers to reclaim the gas that has already been
paid for but not actually taken yet. Edoli et al. (2013) stated that the make
up clauses are mainly stimulated by the decoupling relationship of gas-to-oil
price since the financial crisis in 2008. In this particular situation, the spot price
dropped rapidly, making it economically unfavorable to withdraw contracted gas.
In the presence of make up clauses, the buyers are inclined to strategically delay
contracted gas delivery and anticipate the growth of spot price in the future.
Furthermore, the principles of take-or-pay clauses and make up clauses can also
be applied to quarterly and monthly obligations (Løland and Lindqvist, 2008;
Edoli et al., 2013) to accommodate shorter duration contracts in deregulated
markets. Interested readers can refer to Breslin et al. (2008); Chiarella et al.
(2011); Edoli et al. (2013) for more details on gas contracts with take-or-pay
and make up clauses.
Valuation of these flexible gas contracts with various clauses and constraints is
an important and yet challenging problem in both theoretical research and prac-
tical operation management (Barrera-Esteve et al., 2006; Løland and Lindqvist,
2008). The difficulties mainly arise from the following three aspects. First of
all, the integration of daily and periodic delivery restrictions makes it difficult to
manage contract allocation schedule (Chiarella et al., 2011; Edoli et al., 2013).
Introducing make up clauses as a compensation mechanism for take-or-pay obli-
gations further complicates the operation management and contract valuation.
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Moreover, the computational complexity of the problem heavily relies on the
stochastic model for the underlying natural gas price process. In the literature,
a simple one-factor mean-reverting price model could lead to intensive compu-
tation (Edoli et al., 2013), not to mention a regime switching volatility model
(Chiarella et al., 2011) and a high dimensional term structured model (Lai et al.,
2010). But most importantly, the contract allocation and valuation problems are
commonly scheduled for multiple years on a daily basis, rendering itself to a
computationally intractable problem.
It is, however, noteworthy that to make daily decisions taking into account
uncertainties far ahead in the future, like one year from now, is impractical . In
general, the impact of information in the distant future is relatively negligible.
Thus, it is more rational and realistic to manage the daily operations on a monthly
basis rather than over the entire planning horizon spanning multiple years. In
this way, the large scale problem can be decomposed into a sequence of small
subproblems. In essence, this is much closer to actual operations in practice. It
should be highlighted that the subproblems are connected and dependent due
to the make up clauses. Another motivation for such a decomposition is that the
subproblems in different months share a similar structure and hence an analo-
gous decision rule. Exploiting the policy resemblance property, we can develop
an efficient algorithmic strategy to save tremendous computational effort.
In the context of natural gas contract allocation and valuation, there are
some scheduling decisions that are required to be made month by month in
addition to the daily operations. For example, at the beginning of each month,
the buyer should submit a nomination of a range of monthly gas receipts from the
pipeline for the upcoming month to the pipeline transportation company. This
is because gas delivery from the supplier to the buyer requires transportation
service offered by a pipeline company. The monthly nomination is indispensable
for the pipeline company to arrange the schedule and maintain the balance of
the pipeline system (Juris, 1998a). For the ease of ensuing exposition, we assume
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that the supplier will inject the exact amount of natural gas required by the buyer
into the pipeline system and the buyer will take the same gas amount in the
receipt point without incurring any unbalance at each contractual day. However,
because of price and demand uncertainty, there is a chance that the cumulative
gas delivery amount in the end of each month might fall beyond the monthly
nomination window. In such a situation, penalties will be charged by the pipeline
company for the unbalance between the monthly nomination volume and the
actual taken quantity.
In this chapter, we adopt the idea of multi-time scale Markov decision process
(MMDP) model from Chang et al. (2003) to investigate the contract nomination
and allocation problem with a particular hierarchical structure. In this model, the
monthly nominations in a coarse time scale and daily contract allocations in a
fine time scale together are integrated in a unified framework to address the inter-
action of decision making in different time levels. To the best of our knowledge,
this problem has not been addressed in the previous literature. Moreover, al-
though Chang et al. (2003) had developed an analytical multi-time scale Markov
decision process (MMDP) model and proposed a rolling horizon based heuristic
method to tackle this sort of hierarchically structured sequential decision making
problem, they did not provide any numerical studies to validate the effectiveness
of the MMDP model and the efficiency of the rolling horizon approximation ap-
proach. In contrast, we not only theoretically analyze the asymptotic convergence
result and the error bound of the developed LSPI algorithm, but also numerically
verify the methodology through a series of computational experiments.
This chapter is organized as below. A detailed problem description and MMDP
model formulation are presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 establishes a subop-
timal threshold policy for the lower time level MDP. In Section 5.4, we propose a
least-squares policy iteration algorithm embedded with finite difference stochas-
tic approximation to solve the upper time level MDP. The convergence guarantee
and bound performance of the LSPI algorithm are analyzed in Section 5.5. In
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Section 5.6, we present various numerical experiments to demonstrate the value
of make up clause and the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. At the end,
we draw conclusions in Section 5.7.
5.2 Problem Description and Model Formulation
In this section, we present a detailed description of the multi-time scale contract
allocation and valuation problem for a power generation company (GENCO)
and formulate it by an MMDP model. Consider a medium-term gas contract that
covers gas delivery for two years. The finite planning horizon can be partitioned
into I periods with labels in set I = {1, 2, · · · , I}. For each period i ∈ I, it is
further subdivided into J subperiods with labels in set J = {1, 2, · · · , J}.
Figure 5.1: Hierarchical structured sequential decision making
The sequence of events in the multi-time scale decision making framework is
presented in Figure 5.1 and outlined as follows. At the beginning of the planning
horizon, the GENCO enters into a medium-term bilateral contract with a supplier,
specifying a total Q amount of contracted gas to be delivered over the entire
planning horizon at a predetermined unit contract price pCon. At the beginning
of each month i, the remaining unpaid contract amount Qi and the available
make up gas Mi are updated and the monthly spot price Pi is revealed. With
the knowledge of these state information, the GENCO nominates monthly con-
tract withdrawal amount qi for the upcoming month. Depending on the monthly
nomination action qi in the slow time scale, the GENCO determines the daily
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contract allocation decision aij, j = 1, 2, · · · , J accordingly in the fast time scale.
It is noteworthy that the decision made at the upper time level will affect the
decision making process of the lower time level, but not vice versa. Instead, the
performance produced by the decisions in the lower level will have a great influ-
ence on the upper level’s decisions (Chang et al., 2003). The interaction between
the upper time level problem and the lower time level problem will be further
elaborated in the following two subsections.
5.2.1 Upper Time Level Markov Decision Process
At the beginning of each month i, the remaining unpaid contract amount Qi
and the available make up gas Mi that has been paid but not taken yet are
updated. We denote by Q = [0, Q] and M = [0,M ] the feasible set for the
remaining unpaid contract amount Qi and make up gas Mi, respectively, where
M is the upper bound for the make up bank, as the supplier is unwilling to
reserve too much gas for the buyer. Meanwhile, the monthly spot price Pi is
observed. It should be noted that we use the spot price at the first day of each
month as the monthly spot price, since we cannot foresee prices in the future. By
incorporating these information, the GENCO submits a nomination of contract
amount qi 1 to be withdrawn from the contract for the upcoming month. Due to
the inherent demand uncertainty, the actual monthly cumulative delivery amount
ui would probably deviate from the nomination amount qi. Hence, some flexibility
is offered, allowing the GENCO to take up to ϑiqi amount of contracted gas, where
ϑi > 1. However, the GENCO is restricted to take no more than the agreed total
contract volume Q throughout the planning horizon. In other words, ϑiqi should
not be larger than the remaining unpaid contract amount Qi. Hence, the feasible
action set Qi can be expressed as:
Qi =
{




1The monthly nomination qi does not include make up gas delivery schedule
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Note that the GENCO is obligated to pay for at least ∆iqi amount of contracted
gas regardless of the actual cumulative contract delivery amount ui. The GENCO
cannot take the refunded make up gas Mi until the cumulative contract delivery
amount ui exceeds the take-or-pay level ∆iqi. Based on these two rules, the
remaining unpaid contract amount and the make up gas in the subsequent month
i+ 1 can be updated by
Qi+1 =

Qi −∆iqi, if 0 ≤ ui ≤ ∆iqi,
Qi −∆iqi, if ∆iqi < ui ≤ ∆iqi +Mi
Qi − (ui −Mi), if ∆iqi +Mi < ui ≤ ϑiqi +Mi
= Qi −max{ui −Mi,∆iqi} (5.2)
Mi+1 =

Mi + (∆iqi − ui), if 0 ≤ ui ≤ ∆iqi,
Mi − (ui −∆iqi) if ∆iqi < ui ≤ ∆iqi +Mi
0, if ∆iqi +Mi < ui ≤ ϑiqi +Mi
= (Mi + ∆iqi − ui)+ (5.3)
Depending on the monthly nomination qi, the make up gas Mi and the monthly
spot price Pi, an optimal strategy for dynamically allocating the contracted gas at
the lower time level can be determined accordingly. The resulting total expected
discounted cost ri(qi,Mi, Pi) will serve as a single-step immediate cost for the
upper time level MDP. The expression of ri(qi,Mi, Pi) will be explicitly given in
the following subsection.
Let Ri(Qi,Mi, Pi) denote the optimal value function from month i onward to
the end of the time horizon for given remaining unpaid contracted gas Qi, make
up gas Mi and monthly spot price Pi. The monthly nomination problem in the
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upper time level can be formulated by a Markov decision process (MDP):
Ri(Qi,Mi, Pi) = min
qi∈Qi
ri(qi,Mi, Pi) + γE[Ri+1(Q˜i+1, M˜I+1, P˜i+1)|Pi]
s.t. Q˜i+1 = Qi −max{u˜i −Mi,∆iqi}
M˜i+1 = (Mi + ∆iqi − u˜i)+ (5.4)
RI(QI ,MI , PI) = min
qI∈QI
rI(qI ,MI , PI) + γE[pCon(Q˜I+1 − (1−∆)Q)+]
s.t. Q˜I+1 = QI −max{u˜I −MI ,∆IqI} (5.5)
where γ refers to the monthly risk-free discount rate. The boundary condition in
(5.5) is motivated by the take-or-pay obligation that the GENCO is forced to pay
for at least ∆Q amount of contracted gas in total, where ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
we assume that the remaining make up gas at the end of planning horizon is
worthless and discarded, encouraging the GENCO to clear the make up bank in
the final month.
We use ·˜ to highlight a random variable in the rest of this chapter. The expecta-
tion E is taken with respect to the spot price P˜t+1 in next month and the unknown
cumulative contract delivery amount u˜i. More noteworthy is that the distribution
of u˜i strongly depends on the decision variable qi. In general, a higher monthly
nomination qi provides an incentive for the GENCO to use more contracted gas
u˜i. This decision dependent uncertainty further complicates the problem.
Unlike the traditional MDP model, an explicit expression of the immediate
cost function ri(qi,Mi, Pi) in our upper time level MDP model is unavailable.
Instead, it entails the analysis of daily contract allocation strategy at the lower
time level.
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5.2.2 Lower Time Level Markov Decision Process
At the beginning of each month i, the GENCO further considers an optimization
problem of dynamically allocating the contracted gas for the upcoming month
facing with volatile spot prices pij and stochastic demands Dij, for given make
up gas Mi and monthly nomination amount qi.
First of all, when the monthly nomination qi is submitted, the GENCO also
backups its gas delivery nomination window [∆iqi, qi +Mi] to the transportation
company, as natural gas delivery requires pipeline transportation service. The
nomination window is featured by the minimum bill level ∆iqi and accessible gas
qi + Mi (including the nomination amount and make up gas). It means that no
penalty is charged if the cumulative delivery amount ui falls within the window
[∆iqi, qi +Mi]. Otherwise, the GENCO will be penalized by
β−i p
Con(∆iqi − ui)+ + β+i pCon(ui −Mi − qi)+ (5.6)
where β−i and β
+
i are the penalty rates for insufficient and excessive withdrawal,
respectively. We use x+ = max(x, 0) in the rest of this chapter. At the end of
month i, the GENCO is obligated to pay pCon max{ui − Mi,∆iqi}, induced by
take-or-pay mechanism.
At the beginning of jth day in month i, the GENCO checks the cumulative
contract delivery amount uij, accruing from the beginning of month i up to the jth
day. The feasible range of uij can be denoted by Ui = [0, U i], where U i = ϑiqi+Mi
is the maximum amount of contracted gas that the GENCO can take in month
i. Subsequently, the daily gas spot price pij and power demand Dij are revealed.
For the ease of ensuing exposition, the power demand Dij is represented by the
equivalent amount of natural gas required to meet the demand. We assume that
the demands Dij are identically and independently distributed. Moreover, the
power demands are assumed to be independent of the underlying gas spot price
process pij, which can be modeled by a mean-reverting model.
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Then the GENCO decides the daily contract amount aij to be withdrawn
from the contract. The daily action aij is obviously constrained by the quota of
maximum cumulative delivery U i − uij and the transportation capacity Cd of the
pipeline system. Due to the non-storability of the electricity, it is not necessary to
take more than the demanding amount Dij. Hence the feasible action set for aij
can be expressed as
Aij = {aij ∈ <+ : 0 ≤ aij ≤ min((U i − uij), Dij, Cd)} (5.7)
The daily contract delivery action aij immediately yields a procurement cost
(Dij − aij)pij of purchasing additional (Dij − aij) amount of natural gas from the
spot market to meet the demand.
Let Vij(uij, pij, Dij; qi,Mi) be the optimal value function from the jth day to
the end of month i for given currently cumulative contract delivery amount uij,
spot price pij and demand Dij at the lower time level, as well as the monthly
nomination decision qi and available make up gas Mi from the upper time level.
We denote δ as the daily risk-free discount rate. The dynamic contract allocation
problem at the lower time level can then be formulated as
Vij(uij, pij, Dij; qi,Mi) = min
aij∈Aij
(Dij − aij)pij (5.8)
+ δE[Vi(j+1)(uij + aij, p˜i(j+1), D˜i(j+1); qi,Mi)|pij, Dij]
ViJ(uiJ , piJ , DiJ ; qi,Mi) = min
aiJ∈AiJ
(DiJ − aiJ)piJ + δpCon max{uiJ + aiJ −Mi,∆iqi}
+ δβ−i p
Con[∆iqi − (uiJ + aiJ)]+
+ δβ+i p
Con[(uiJ + aiJ)−Mi − qi]+ (5.9)
Note that the coupling relationship between these two MDP models in differ-
ent time levels can be captured by ri(qi,Mi, Pi) = E[Vi1(0, pi1, D˜i1; qi,Mi)|pi1 =
Pi].
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5.3 Threshold Policy for Lower Time Level MDP
In this section, we aim to solve the lower time level MDP and obtain an optimal
(or suboptimal) policy. To begin with, we note that it is inappropriate to directly
use the Bellman’s equation(5.8)-(5.9) to derive the optimal policy, since the
boundary condition (5.9) indicates that the make up gas seems to be abandoned.
Thus, it drives the GENCO to consume more than the take-or-pay amount ∆iqi
with little gas carried over to next month in any circumstance, making the make
up clause pointless. This can be attributed to the fact that the value of make up
gas is taken into account in the upper time level MDP, but not incorporated in
the lower time level MDP. To fix the issue, we are in dire need of the value of
make up gas, which, unfortunately, is unknown.
Recall that the make up gas that is carried over to next month is Mi+1 =
(Mi + ∆iqi−ui)+, the value of which should at least be pConMi+1. Otherwise, it is
not favorable to postpone gas delivery. Hence, we modify the boundary condition
(5.9) by deducting the value of make up gas, which can be approximated by
pConMi+1. After simplification, it results in the following auxiliary problem
ViJ(uiJ , piJ , DiJ ; qi,Mi) = min
aiJ∈AiJ
(DiJ − aiJ)piJ + δpCon(uiJ + aiJ −Mi)
+ δβ−i p
Con[∆iqi − (uiJ + aiJ)]+
+ δβ+i p
Con[(uiJ + aiJ)−Mi − qi]+ (5.10)
A major benefit of this approximation is that it allows us to exploit the prop-
erty of the value function and establish an optimal threshold policy for the modi-
fied MDP model under some mild assumption:
Assumption 5.1. For any month i, it holds that E[p˜ik|p˜ij = p] <∞, j ∈ J , k ∈ J
with k ≥ j and p ∈ <+.
Proposition 5.2. When Assumption 5.1 holds, the value function Vij(uij, pij, Dij, qi,Mi)
is convex in the cumulative contract delivery amount uij for fixed monthly decision
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and make up gas level qi,Mi and given the daily price and demand information
pij, Dij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J .
Proof: The claimed convexity can be shown by mathematical induction. At
the final stage J , we can show that β−i p
Con[∆iqi − (uiJ + aiJ)]+ is jointly convex
in (uiJ , aiJ) for fixed monthly decision and make up gas level qi,Mi. Specifically,





















∆iqi − (u1iJ + a1iJ)
)
+ (1− λ) (∆iqi − (u2iJ + a2iJ))]+ (5.11)
≤ λβ−i pCon
[
∆iqi − (u1iJ + a1iJ)
]+
+ (1− λ)β−i pCon
[
∆iqi − (u2iJ + a2iJ)
]+
Likewise, we can show the joint convexity of β+i p
Con[(uiJ + aiJ) −Mi − qi]+ as
well. Besides, it is evident that the first two terms are also convex in (uiJ , aiJ).
Hence the objective function of the modified boundary condition (5.10) is jointly
convex in (uiJ , aiJ). It then follows from convexity preservation (Boyd and Van-
denberghe, 2004) that the value function ViJ(uiJ , piJ , DiJ ; qi,Mi) is convex in
uiJ ∈ Ui.
Make the induction hypothesis that the stated convexity also holds in stages
j + 1, j + 2, · · · , J . We next show that it is also true for stage j. In particular, the
hypothesis implies that E[Vi(j+1)(uij + aij, p˜i(j+1), D˜i(j+1); qi,Mi)|pij, Dij] is jointly
convex in (uij, aij). Combining with the fact that (Dij − aij)pij is trivially convex
in (uij, aij), we obtain that the objective function in (5.8) is also jointly convex
in (uij, aij). Hence, the optimal value function Vij(uij, pij, Dij; qi,Mi) is convex
in uij (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004). In conclusion, the stated convexity of
Vij(uij, pij, Dij; qi,Mi) in uij holds for all j ∈ J by the principle of mathematical
induction. 
Proposition 5.2 is then leveraged to show that a state dependent threshold
policy is optimal for the modified lower time level MDP.
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Proposition 5.3. For each day j ∈ J in month i ∈ I, there exists a threshold level
Zij(pij; qi,Mi) which depends on monthly nomination decision qi, make up gas Mi
and the spot price pij in current period i, such that the optimal action a∗ij for any
given state (uij, pij, Dij, qi,Mi) is
a∗ij(uij, pij, Dij; qi,Mi) = min{Cd, Dij, (Zij(pij; qi,Mi)− uij)+} (5.12)
Proof: Pick any feasible state (uij, pij, Dij; qi,Mi) in the jth day of month i. To
determine the optimal action aij in this state, we relax the withdraw capacity
constraint and demand restriction on aij and use ui(j+1) = uij + aij as a new
decision variable. Substituting aij with ui(j+1) − uij into (5.8), the optimization
problem can be reformulated as:
min
ui(j+1)∈[uij ,U i]
(Dij−ui(j+1) +uij)pt+δE[Vi(j+1)(ui(j+1), p˜i(j+1), D˜i(j+1); qi,Mi)|pij, Dij]
(5.13)
Consider a particular case with uij = 0, then (5.13) is equivalent to
min
ui(j+1)∈[0,U i]
−ui(j+1)pij + δE[Vi(j+1)(ui(j+1), p˜i(j+1), D˜i(j+1); qi,Mi)|pij, Dij] (5.14)
The convexity of Vi(j+1) implies that the objective function of the relaxed
minimization problem (5.14) is also convex in ui(j+1), following from the prop-
erty that expectation preserves convexity. Therefore the corresponding optimal
solution is the global minimum, denoted by u∗i(j+1)(pij, Dij; qi,Mi).
Note that the demands Dij are assumed to be identically and independently
distributed, and the objective function of (5.14) is independent of Dt because
of the expectation operation. Consequently, the corresponding optimal solution
u∗i(j+1)(pij, Dij; qi,Mi) is independent of Dij. Therefore, we denote the optimal
solution of the relaxed minimization problem (5.14) by Zij(pij; qi,Mi) for nota-
tional simplicity.
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of threshold policy
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Threshold surface at 15th day
Now consider the minimization problem (5.13) for uij ∈ [0, Zij(pij; qi,Mi)], as
shown in left left panel in Figure 5.2. Since Zij(pij; qi,Mi) ∈ [uij, U i], the optimal
solution is achieved at u∗i(j+1) = Zij(pij; qi,Mi). Therefore the pertinent part of
the decision policy holds when the withdraw capacity constraint and demand
restriction are imposed on at. On the other hand, if uij > Zij(pij; qi,Mi) (as
depicted in the right panel of Figure 5.2), the convexity of the objective function
of (5.13) implies that the objective function monotonously increases in ui(j+1) in
the interval of [uij, U i]. Hence, the minimum value is achieved at u∗i(j+1) = uij. In
other words, the optimal action is purchasing from the spot market to satisfy all
of the demand in current stage. The proof is completed.
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Figure 5.3 plots the threshold surface against price pij, monthly nomination
qi and make up gas Mi at the 15th day. As shown in Figure 5.3a, the threshold
level Zij(pij; qi,Mi) monotonically increases with qi for given price pij and make
up gas Mi. It indicates that the buyer is willing to withdraw more contracted
gas if the buyer nominates more. Likewise, Figure 5.3b implies that the higher
the availability of make up gas is, the more the buyer is inclined to deliver. This
finding is consistent with the intuition of the operation.
The optimal threshold policy implies that if the cumulative contract delivery
amount uij is lower than the optimal threshold Zij(pij; qi,Mi), then it is optimal to
use the contracted gas such that the cumulative contract delivery amount ui(j+1)
approaches as close to the threshold level as possible. Otherwise, it is optimal
to purchase all the demanded gas from the spot market. The optimal threshold
Zij(pij; qi,Mi) can be easily computed through standard backward dynamic pro-
gramming for any given qi at any month i, following Proposition 3 in Secomandi
(2010). It should be noted that the threshold policy is optimal for the modified
MDP, but suboptimal to the original lower time level MDP model.
Remark:
1. The subproblems in different months share a similar structure and hence
an analogous threshold policy. This policy resemblance property can be
utilized to boost computation efficiency. For given monthly nomination qi
and make up gas Mi, the optimal threshold level Zij(pij; qi,Mi) is mainly
characterized by the spot price pij. Note that the underlying price pro-
cesses in different months are the same except for distinct seasonality fac-
tors. Therefore, instead of computing the threshold levels Zij(pij; qi,Mi),
we compute the modified threshold levels Zij(pdij; qi,Mi) corresponding to
the deseasonalized spot price pdij = pij/sfi for an arbitrary month i, where
sfi refers to the season factor of month i. Thus, the modified threshold
levels Zij(pdij; qi,Mi) should be applicable to all months i = 1, 2, · · · , I − 1.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: Threshold surface at 15th day of last month
2. The policy of the last month is different from the previous months, be-
cause the remaining make up gas at the end of the planning horizon is
worthless and discarded. The termination rule drives the GENCO to use
up all contracted gas, leaving as little gas in the make up bank as possible.
Nevertheless, we can show the optimal threshold policy and compute the
associated optimal threshold levels ZIj(pIj; qI ,MI) for the last month in
a similar manner. Figure 5.4 displays the threshold surface against price
pij, monthly nomination qi and make up gas Mi at the 15th day of the last
month. In comparison with Figure 5.3, it is intuitive that ZIj(pIj; qI ,MI)
would be much higher than their counterparts in the previous months.
5.4 Least-Squares Policy Iteration Algorithm for
Upper Time Level MDP
Having established a suboptimal threshold policy for the lower time level MDP,
we now search for an efficient algorithm to approximately solve the upper time
level MDP in this section.
We consider an upper time level MDP with continuous state and action space.
Under this circumstance, standard backward dynamic programming suffers from
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the notorious “curse of dimensionality”. To break the curse of dimensionality,
it is necessary to introduce parametric value function approximation in place
of the cumbersome tabular representation. In the literature, the value function
is commonly represented by a weighted linear combination of a set of basis
functions. The linear function approximation is attractive because it is easy to
implement and powerful to approximate the complex value function. Therefore,
we adopt the widely used linear approximation architecture in our context.
Let ψib(Qi,Mi, Pi) and θib be the bth basis function in month i and its associated
weight. Denote by Ψi = (ψi1, ψi2, · · · , ψiB)T and θi = (θi1, θi2, · · · , θiB)T the set of
basis functions and corresponding weight vectors, respectively, where B denotes
the number of the basis functions and the superscript T denotes the transpose





θibψib(Qi,Mi, Pi) = (θi)
TΨi(Qi,Mi, Pi) (5.15)
with the value function approximation in (5.15) and the monthly nomination
decision rule can be determined by solving the following optimization problem:
min
qi
ri(qi,Mi, Pi) + γE[(θi+1)TΨi+1(Q˜i+1, M˜i+1, P˜i+1)|Pi]
s.t. Q˜i+1 = Qi −max{u˜i −Mi,∆iqi}
M˜i+1 = (Mi + ∆iqi − u˜i)+ (5.16)
Denote the optimal solution of (5.16) by qpii (Qi,Mi, Pi|θi+1), where the super-
script pi refers to a policy. This optimal solution is “greedy” with respect to the
value function approximation (θi+1)TΨi(Qi+1,Mi+1, Pi+1), or more precisely, the
tunable parameters θi+1. If the linear function approximation asymptotically con-
verges to the optimal value function, the resulting greedy policy pi turns out to
be an optimal or near optimal policy. Hence, we strive to find the optimal θ∗i





2 , · · · , qpi∗I ) simultaneously.
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In an attempt to achieve this goal, we propose a Least Squares Policy Iteration
(LSPI) algorithm by generating a sequence of monotonically improving policies
pi1, pi2, · · · , pin that converge to the optimal pi∗. The architecture of the LSPI al-
gorithm is depicted in Figure 5.5. The proposed LSPI algorithm is an iterative
algorithmic strategy of optimizing while learning that consists of two loops: The
inner loop evaluates the value of a policy and the outer loop updates an improved
greedy policy. The details of these two steps are further elaborated below.
Figure 5.5: Architecture of LSPI algorithm
5.4.1 Policy Evaluation
For a given fixed policy pin, we use a double-pass framework to evaluate the
value of the current policy. In the forward pass, we generate a set of trajectories
k = 1, 2, · · · , K starting from Qk1,Mk1 and P k1 . Those initial states can be chosen






that compromise the trajectories are produced following the state update rule:
Qki+1 = Q
k





i − uki )+ (5.17)
with










i −max{u˜ki −Mki ,∆iqi}, (Mki + ∆iqi − u˜ki )+, P˜i+1)
]
where qn,ki denotes the action associated with the k
th trajectory in month i follow-
ing current policy pin and θn−1i+1 refers to the approximate weight vector at month
i + 1 in the (n − 1)th iteration. u˜ki is the cumulative contract delivery amount
along trajectory k at month i and uki is one of its realization. Besides, we can also






i ) in the forward step by sample
average approximation.
In the backward pass, the value of the current policy can be estimated by
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i ). The temporal difference term d
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i describes the updating error of
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In this perspective, the temporal difference can be regarded as an adjustment to




i ). Sutton (1988)
proposed to put less weights on the correction terms that are farther along the




















Note that when λ = 1, equation (5.22) is equivalent to equation (5.19). On the





























i ) is biased, but with
lower variance. From this point of view, λ balances the trade-off between bias
and variance (Boyan, 2002).
5.4.2 Policy Improvement
What remains to be specified is how to update the weight vector θni . The attrac-
tiveness of LSPI is that the closed form of the estimated weight vector is available
via ordinary least square projection.
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along a set of trajectories k = 1, 2, · · · , K. The estimated weight parameter θˆni












i )− Rˆpini (Qki ,Mki , P ki )
)2
(5.24)













































The new weight vector can be smoothed with previous estimation of the following
form
θni = (1− αn−1)θn−1i + αn−1θˆni (5.26)
The pseudo-code of the proposed LSPI algorithm is summarized in Algorithm
5. There are four difficulties that remain to be addressed during the implementa-
tion of the LSPI algorithm in the context of MMDP. First of all, the performance
of the designed algorithm heavily relies on the choice of basis functions. Sec-
ondly, we cannot guarantee to find a global optimal solution for the optimization
problem (5.18), because the objective function is multimodal. This can be mainly
attributed to the max{·, ·} and (·)+ operators in the state transition. Thirdly, it is
not an easy task to compute the expectation embedded in (5.18). Note that the
expectation is taken with respect to the conditional spot price p˜i(j+i) and the cu-
mulative contract delivery amount u˜i in month i, which depends on the monthly
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Algorithm 5 LSPI algorithm
Inputs: Number of maximum iteration N and the basis function set {Ψi,∀i ∈ I}.
• Step 0 (Initialization):
– Step 0a. Initialize the weight θ0i for all i = 1, 2, · · · , I ;
– Step 0b. Set iteration count n = 1;
• Step 1 Do for k = 1, 2, · · · , K.
Initialize Qk1 and M
k
1 , generate a sample path P
k = {P k1 , P k2 , · · · , P kI }.
• Step 2 Do for i = 1, 2, · · · , I;
– Step 2a. Solve the optimization problem










i −max{u˜ki −Mki ,∆iqi}, (Mki + ∆iqi − u˜ki )+, P˜i+1)
]
– Step 2b. Update the states
Qki+1 = Q
k





i − uki )+































i )− Rˆpini (Qki ,Mki , P ki )
)2
• Step 5 Update the weight vector θni for all i = 1, 2, · · · , I.
θni = (1− αn−1)θn−1i + αn−1θˆni
• Step 6 If n < N , let n = n+ 1 and go back to step 1 .
• Step 7 Return the weight vector θNi for all i = 1, 2, · · · , I.
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nomination decision qi. The dependency relationship between the random vari-
able and decision variable further complicates the optimization. Lastly, unlike the
traditional MDP where the immediate reward function is explicitly given, our up-
per time level MDP model uses the expected monthly cost ri(qi,Mi, Pi) as a single
step reward function, the closed form of which is, unfortunately, unavailable.
5.4.3 Basis Function for Value Function Approximation
In this subsection, we carefully choose the set of basis functions to characterize
the feature of the optimal value function. Polynomial function is a popular choice
that has been widely used in the literature. The advantage of polynomial function
is that it can be separated into endogenous(EN) and exogenous (EX) components
of the state (Nadarajah et al., 2013)















The expectation term E[ψEXi+1,b(P˜i+1)|Pi] in (5.28) can be computed analytically
by exploiting the property of the price model. Consider two particular cases:




i+1. Assume that the evolution of nat-
ural gas spot price Pt is described by a single-factor mean-reversion model
dXt = −κ(Xt − ξ)dt + σdWt (see Section 3.4), where Xt = ln(Pt/sft) is the
logarithm of deseasonalized spot price and sft denotes the season factor. Given
the information of Xt, the random variable Xt+∆t is normally distributed with
mean and variance (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
E[Xt+∆t|Xt] = e−κ∆tXt + ξ(1− e−κ∆t)
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Thus, the conditional spot price at t + ∆t is lognormally distributed with mean
E[Pt+∆t|Pt] and variance V ar[Pt+∆t|Pt] :
E[Pt+∆t|Pt] = sft+∆t exp
(
ln(Pt/sft)e





























where hi+1,b(Pi) represents a function of current spot price Pi.
5.4.4 Finite Difference Stochastic Approximation (FDSA) Al-
gorithm
With appropriate features for value function approximation, the remaining chal-
lenges discussed in Section 5.4.2 can be summed up as how to solve the opti-
mization problem in step 2a of Algorithm 5. In this subsection, we propose a
finite difference stochastic approximation algorithm to resolve this issue.
To begin with, the main feature of the optimization problem (5.18) that
makes it difficult to solve is the decision dependent uncertainty. In our context,
the cumulative contract delivery amount u˜ki strongly depends on the monthly
nomination decision qi as well as the realization of the daily price and demand
uncertainty over the entire month in lower time level MDP. For a given monthly
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nomination amount qi, we can obtain the sampled realization of the cumulative
contract delivery amount u˜ki via Monte Carlo simulation. With this in mind, we
adopt a gradient-based search algorithm to find the optimal solution qn,ki of
(5.18) in an iterative way. The main idea is to start from an initial guess of
the optimal monthly nomination qˆ0i , and we iteratively generate a sequence of
qˆ0i , qˆ
1
i , · · · , qˆhi , · · · such that
qˆhi = qˆ
h−1
i − ρhgˆhi (qˆh−1i ) (5.33)











|q=qh−1i refers to the






i , q) at qˆ
h−1








i , q) denotes the objective function of the optimization problem
(5.18). However, the unknown explicit form of r¯i(qi,Mi, Pi) and the decision
dependent uncertainty prevent us from obtaining the stochastic gradient by
taking the partial derivative directly.
Alternatively, we could use the finite difference method to approximate the
stochastic gradient. Provided that the monthly nomination qˆh−1i is given, the














i −max{u˜ki −Mki ,∆iqˆh−1i }, (Mki + ∆iqˆh−1i − u˜ki )+, P˜i+1)
]




i ) can be evaluated via sample average













h)− fni (Qki ,Mki , P ki , qˆh−1i − ch)
2chi
(5.34)
where ch is the perturbation value in the hth iteration. We are now ready to
present the proposed FDSA algorithm as shown in Algorithm 6.
It has been shown that the FDSA algorithm guarantees to converge for a
Lipschitz continuous function that has a unique optimum solution under some
mild assumptions on ρh and ch (Spall, 2005). However, the objective function of
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Algorithm 6 Finite Difference Stochastic Approximation (FDSA) Algorithm
Inputs: Initial feasible monthly nomination qˆ0i , the approximate weight vector
θni , the basis function Ψi and maximum number of iterations H.
• Step 1 Set the iteration count h = 1.
• Step 2 Generate samples and compute the sampled gradient gˆhi (qˆh−1i ) using
finite difference approach (5.34).
• Step 3 Update the step size ρh.
• Step 4 Update the monthly nomination amount qhi for next iteration.
qˆhi = qˆ
h−1
i − ρhgˆhi (qˆh−1i )
If qˆhi is infeasible, project it into the feasible region.
• Step 5 If h < H, let h = h+ 1 and go back to step 2 .
• Step 6 Return qˆHi .
(5.18) is multimodal, probably inducing the FDSA algorithm to be trapped in a
local optimum solution. Hence, the multi-start technique can be used to improve
the performance of the FDSA algorithm (Yin, 1999). Interested readers can refer
to Spall (2005) for more detailed information on FDSA, such as guidelines of
step size choice and convergence guarantee.
5.5 Convergence and Error Bound
In this section, we provide a convergence guarantee for the proposed LSPI al-
gorithm and associated performance bound. We start with establishing the con-
vergence result for a least squares policy iteration algorithm for a general finite
horizon MDP model.
Consider a general finite horizon Markov decision problem with T stages.
For each stage t = 1, 2, · · · , T , denote by st ∈ St, at ∈ At the state variable and
associated action, respectively, where St andAt are the corresponding state space
and action space at stage t. Let ωt ∈ Ωt be the random variable, which is assumed
to be an exogenous variable. With each state st ∈ St and action at ∈ At, we can
102
obtain the immediate cost Ct(st, at) and state at next stage st+1 = Ft(st, at, ωt),
where Ft : St ×At × Ωt → St+1 refers to a general state transition function. We
denote by pi = {a1, a2, · · · , aT} a policy consisting of a sequence of mappings
at : St × Ωt → At. The value of a given policy pi at state (st, ωt) is defined by




γτ−tCτ (sτ , aτ (sτ , ωτ )) + γT+1−tCT+1(st)
]
(5.35)
with sτ+1 = Fτ (sτ , aτ (sτ , ωτ ), ωτ ) for τ = t, t + 1, · · · , T . Note that at the ter-
minal stage T + 1, the instantaneous cost CT+1(st) only depends on the state,
since no action is taken. The goal is then to search for the optimal policy pi∗ =
{a∗1, a∗2, · · · , a∗T} such that
J∗t (st, ωt) = min
at,··· ,aT
J¯pit (st, ωt) (5.36)
where J∗t (st, ωt) refers to the optimal value function at stage t for given st ∈ St
and ωt ∈ Ωt.
Before proceeding to the convergence result, a brief description of the general
finite horizon LSPI algorithm is presented with some shorthand notations for the
ease of ensuing exposition. We denote by n the iteration number. For a given
weight vector θn−1t ,∀t = 1, 2, · · · , T , we could compute the corresponding greedy




Ct(st, at) + γE[(θn−1t+1 )TΨ(Ft(st, at, ωt), ω˜t+1)]
)
(5.37)
Thus, a greedy policy pin is defined as a sequence of greedy actions {an1 , an2 , · · · , anT}.
By generating a sample path of random variables ω = {ω1, ω2, · · · , ωT}, a trajec-
tory that starts from any initial state st can be sequentially produced following
the greedy policy pin along the sample path.
Let J¯pint (st, ωt) and Jˆ
pin
t (st, ωt) be the expected and observed cumulative
discounted cost of the trajectory starting from state (st, ωt) incurred by the
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t (st, ωt), where
wnt (st, ωt) is a zero mean white noise induced by sample approximation. The







TΨt(st, ωt)− Jˆpint (st, ωt)
)2
(5.38)
By ordinary least squares theory, we can obtain that
(θˆnt )
TΨt(st, ωt) = Jˆ
pin
t (st, ωt)− nt (st, ωt) (5.39)
where nt (st, ωt) refers to the regression error which accounts for the discrepancy
between the observed cumulative discounted cost Jˆpint (st, ωt) and the predicted
value (θˆnt )
TΨt(st, ωt). Recall that the updating weight vector θnt is smoothed by
θnt = (1− αn−1)θn−1t + αn−1θˆnt (5.40)
Let Jnt (st, ωt) = (θ
n
t )
TΨt(st, ωt) be the approximate value function at the nth
iteration. The updating rule in equation (5.40) is equivalent to
Jnt (st, ωt) = (1− αn−1)Jn−1t (st, ωt) + αn−1(Jˆpint (st, ωt)− nt (st, ωt)) (5.41)
= (1− αn−1)Jn−1t (st, ωt) + αn−1(J¯pint (st, ωt) + wnt (st, ωt)− nt (st, ωt))
The logic behind the LSPI algorithm is to iteratively update an improved
policy that produces a better performance than the previous one. However, this
policy improvement property may not necessarily hold for all iterations due to
the disturbance caused by the approximation error and regression error in the
general LSPI algorithm. Chances are that the performance J¯pin+1 of the updated
policy pin+1 can be deteriorated, compared with the previous approximate value
function Jnt which was used for policy improvement. The lemma below provides






J¨nt (st, ωt)− Jnt (st, ωt)
)
(5.42)
where J¨nt (st, ωt) = minat∈At Ct(st, at) + γE[Jnt+1(Ft(st, at, ωt), ωt+1)]. Then we have




for all (st, ωt) ∈ St × Ωt and t = 1, 2, · · · , T .
Lemma 5.4 is a simple adaption of Proposition 3.2 in Bertsekas (2005). The
proof is displayed in Appendix B. Lemma 5.4 indicates that the performance of
fixed policy pin is bounded from above by the previous approximate value function
Jn−1t with a scalar
T∑
τ=t
γτ−tςn−1t . As ς
n−1
t may not necessarily be non-positive, there
exists a chance that the performance of the current policy pin might be worse
than the previous value function approximation Jn−1t which is used to generate
a new policy pin.
Combining the updating rule (5.41) and the performance bound (5.43), we
have





t (st, ωt)− nt (st, ωt)) (5.44)
Taking expectation to both sides of inequality (5.44) conditional on Jnt (st, ωt)
yields
E[Jn+1t (st, ωt)|Jnt (st, ωt)] = (1− αn)Jnt (st, ωt) + αnE[J¯pin+1t (st, ωt)]
≤ (1− αn)Jnt (st, ωt) + αn
(










If ςnt converges to zero or less, we can conclude thatE[Jn+1t (st, ωt)|Jnt (st, ωt)] ≤
Jnt (st, ωt), which is a nice property that can be used to show convergence. In the
ensuing analysis, we impose natural assumptions on the approximation error wnt
and the regression error nt as well as a common condition for the learning rate
αn.
Assumption 5.5. For each iteration n and each stage t = 1, 2, · · · , T , we assume
that
1. E[wnt (st, ωt)|Ft] = 0, E[(wnt (st, ωt))2 |Ft] <∞
2. E[nt (st, ωt)] = 0, E[nt (st, ωt)]2 <∞
where Ft refers to the history of the trajectory up to stage t, but it does not
include any information from stage t onward to the end of the planning horizon.







Borrowing the idea from Tsitsiklis (2003) on the convergence proof of the
optimistic policy iteration algorithm for an infinite horizon MDP, we establish a
convergence result for a general finite horizon LSPI algorithm in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.7. Under Assumptions 5.5 and 5.6, it holds that lim
n→∞
ςni ≤ 0. More-
over, let J∞t (st, ωt) = lim
n→∞
sup Jnt (st, ωt). Then J
n
t (st, ωt)→ J∞t (st, ωt) almost surely
for all (st, ωt) ∈ St × Ωt and t = 1, 2, · · · , T
The proof of Proposition 5.7 is provided in Appendix B. In Tsitsiklis (2003),
the sequence of approximate value functions generated by the optimistic policy it-
eration is guaranteed to converge to the optimal cost-to-go function by exploiting
the monotonicity properties of the Bellman’s operator. However, in the absence
of such monotonicity property in the context of finite horizon MDP, we can only
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guarantee that the approximate value function Jnt (st, ωt) converges in the limit,
but not necessarily the optimal value function.
Remark: In certain situations, the expression of the instantaneous cost
Ct(st, at) is unknown but its noisy measurements are available, which allow us
to approximate the cost by sample average approximation C¯t(st, at). Note that
there is no special requirement or condition on the immediate cost Ct(st, at) for
Proposition 5.7. Therefore, replacing Ct(st, at) by its approximation C¯t(st, at)
does not affect the convergence property of the proposed LSPI algorithm. It,
however, makes an impact on where the algorithm converges.
Having established the convergence guarantee in the limit, it is natural to
question how good the limiting value function approximation is. Next, we pro-
ceed to derive the worst case bound of the discrepancy between the limiting value
function approximation J∞t and the true optimal value function J
∗
t . Denote the
worst case error bound by et = ||J∞t − J∗t ||∞ = max
st,ωt









|nt (st, ωt)|. We have the following
proposition.







Moreover, if the true immediate cost Ct(st, at) is approximated by C¯t(st, at) with
approximation error esubt = ||C¯t − Ct||∞ = max
(st,at)









The proof of Proposition 5.8 is presented in Appendix B. It shows that the
gap between the limiting value function J∞t and the true optimal value function
J∗t is bounded by the summation of discounted errors induced by sample ap-
proximation, linear regression and immediate cost approximation, if applicable.
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We remark that it is not an easy task to estimate the values of these errors in
practice. The significance of the maximum norm error bound presented in (5.48)
is that it guarantees to bound the performance of the limiting value function
approximation J∞t , not too far away from the true optimal value function J
∗
t .




t similarly as above.
Following from Propositions 5.7 and 5.8, we can show the convergence perfor-
mance of the proposed LSPI Algorithm 5.
Corollary 5.9. The sequence of approximate value functions Rni (Qi,Mi, Pi) =
θni Ψi(Qi,Mi, Pi) generated by Algorithm 5 converges almost surely for any








τ ) away from the optimal value function R
∗
i .
It is not difficult to verify that Assumptions 5.5 and 5.6 are satisfied in the
proposed LSPI Algorithm 5. Hence, Algorithm 5 converges with probability 1.
However, it does not guarantee to converge to the true optimal value function,
due to the existence of sample approximation error w∞t , regression error 
∞
t and
subproblem approximation error esubi . Nevertheless, we could bound the gap
between the limiting value function and the optimal value function by a simple
adaptation of Proposition 5.8.
5.6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we conduct a series of numerical analyses to assess the value
of make up clause and measure the impact of seasonality, price volatility and
take-or-pay level. Furthermore, we also numerically analyze the performance of
the proposed LSPI algorithm for the MMDP model.
5.6.1 Experiment Setup
In the experiment, we describe the underlying gas spot price process by the same
single-factor mean-reverting model as discussed in Section 3.4 . The only differ-
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ence is that seasonality is taken into account in this medium-term scheduling
problem. Seasonality has been observed to exist in such a way that prices are in-
clined to be higher in winter and lower during summer. The phenomenon implies
that it is beneficial to withdraw more contracted gas in winter than in summer.
Therefore, for a multi-time scale contract allocation and valuation problem span-
ning one or two years, it is indispensable to address the seasonality factor. To
capture the seasonality effect, we adopt a stepwise function with 12 different
values, one for each calendar month (Jaillet et al., 2004). As the main purpose of
this study is to solve the contract allocation and valuation problem rather than to
calibrate the underlying price process, we directly employ the estimation values
of these 12 monthly seasonality factors from Jaillet et al. (2004), as presented in
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Estimated parameter values for monthly seasonality factors













Similar to the numerical experiments in Chapter 3, we assume that daily
power demands are identically and independently distributed. In order to solve
the problem by backward dynamic programming, we also discretize the daily
demand distribution, as displayed in Table 5.2. Accordingly, we set the delivery
capacity Cd = 0.08, imposed by the physical transportation pipeline network.
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Table 5.2: Discretized daily demand distribution in MMDP
Demand 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.4 0.25 0.1 0.05
Regarding the contract settlement, it is compulsory for the GENCO to pay
all the remaining contracted gas at the end of the planning horizon, that is
∆ = 1. For the ease of ensuing analysis, we also assume that the GENCO is
obligated to pay 80% of the monthly nomination amount for each month, i.e.
∆i = 0.8,∀i = 1, 2, · · · , I. Meanwhile, we let the flexibility coefficient for addi-
tional withdrawal be ϑi = 1.1. Thus, the GENCO is allowed to take an additional
10% of the nomination amount other than the nominated amount and make up
gas. If insufficient or excessive withdrawal occurs, penalties will be charged by
the transportation company with β−i = 5%× pCon and β+i = 10%× pCon, where
the unit contract price is pCon = 4.2. Also, the make up bank is capacitated with
a cap of M = 1, meaning that the maximum amount of make up gas that can be
carried over to the next month is 1.
At the end, we use a 5% risk-free interest rate to generate the monthly dis-
count factor γ = 0.9957 in the experiment. Consequently, the daily risk-free
discount factor is extremely close to 1 and hence we set δ = 1.
5.6.2 Value of Make Up Clause
Make up clause arises as a common feature of natural gas contracts in recent
years. It is therefore of interest to measure the importance of incorporating make
up clause into the contracts. In this subsection, we take a six-month simple
problem as an illustrative example to numerically quantify the value of make up
clause. Two types of contracts are investigated for this purpose:
• Natural gas contract with take-or-pay clause but without make up clause;
• Natural gas contract with take-or-pay clause and make up clause.
110
With these contracts’ specifications, the MMDP model is solved by standard back-
ward dynamic programming with state discretization. Figure 5.6a plots the ex-
pected total cost with respect to contract quantityQ in the presence of seasonality
effect. It is evident that introducing make up clause helps to reduce the expected
total cost. This is because the take-or-pay clause enforces the contract holder to
pay a minimum periodic contract amount, even if it is not actually taken. Those
contract amount that have been paid but not taken can be regarded as financial
loss. In the presence of make up clause, the buyer can reclaim those gas for the
sake of loss reduction. However, when the contract volume is very large, it is
very likely that there is some make up gas remaining unclaimed at the end of
the planning horizon, because of the cap of the make up bank. Those remaining
make up gas will be discarded, resulting in a significant loss.
(a) With seasonality (b) Without seasonality
Figure 5.6: Effect of seasonality on expected total cost R
Also, the optimal contract amount to engage for contract with make up clause
is 6.8, (as depicted by triangle marks in Figure 5.6a). Note that the expected
monthly demand is around 2, according to the discretized daily demand distribu-
tion in Table 5.2. It indicates that the optimal contract quantity is around 56.7%
of the expected total demand, which further confirms the significance of incorpo-
rating make up clause. Note that the optimal contract quantity for contracts with
make up clause is slightly lower than that of contracts without make up clause.
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A plausible explanation is that the buyer is motivated to avoid the situation of
leaving too much make up gas behind at the end of the time horizon.
Furthermore, we adopt a widely employed financial metric “return on in-
vestment (ROI)” to evaluate the benefit of an investment relative to the resource
invested. In our context, the investment is lockingQ amount of natural gas supply
in a contract at a predetermined price pCon. Denote by R(Q) the expected total
cost for a take-or-pay contract with size Q. The associated ROI can be calculated
by





Therefore, we can obtain the ROI indexes for both types of contracts in terms of
their optimal contract quantity Q∗, respectively. Define ROIMU and ROINoMU
by the return on investment indexes for both contracts with the superscripts
denoting the contract type, respectively. Hence, the value of make up clause








As discussed in section 5.6.1, seasonality plays an important role in natural gas
supply management, especially for medium term or long term scheduling. We
investigate the effect of seasonality by removing the seasonality factor for a
comparison, as shown in Figure 5.6. As can be seen, the optimal contract quantity
decreases when seasonality factor is not taken into account, indicating that take-
or-pay contracts, either with or without make up clause, are less attractive to
buyers when seasonality effect is removed. This is consistent with our intuition.
Figure 5.6 also shows that without seasonality factors, the expected total expense
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R is cut down. This is because the seasonality factors we used in this experiment
[0.9731, 1.029, 1.092, 1.107, 1.061, 1.010] (most of which are above 1) are driving
the spot price much higher than its counterpart without seasonality.
Table 5.3: Impact of seasonality on value of make up clause




Table 5.3 displays the ROI indexes for both contracts and associated values
of make up clause under the two scenarios discussed above. It can be seen that
the ROI indexes for both contracts are higher than the 5% risk-free interest rate,
meaning that it is profitable to lock a proportion of natural gas supply by a bi-
lateral contract, especially when the market prices exhibit a strong seasonality
trend. The result also suggests that the benefit of incorporating make up clause
is remarkable, since it can raise the ROI by 3.3023%, and more importantly, at
almost no cost. However, contrary to intuition, the value of make up clause dimin-
ishes when seasonality effect is taken into consideration. A possible explanation
is that with incorporation of seasonality, the optimal contract quantity increases
(as shown in Figure 5.6), giving rise to a higher probability of make up gas loss.
Consequently, it reduces the profits that the GENCO can gain from the make up
clause.
Impact of Price Volatility
Inspired by the frequently changing market conditions, the GENCO enters into a
bilateral contract to hedge against risk exposure. By promptly responding to the
volatile spot price, the GENCO can strategically manage its contract allocation
to make profit or reduce cost. Hence, it is worth examining the impact of price
volatility on the value of the contract and the make up clause.
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Figure 5.7 presents the effect of price volatility σ on the expected total cost
R. Comparing Figures 5.7a -5.7d, we can see that when the contract volume
Q is small, the expected total cost of natural gas supply R increases with price
volatility σ; whereas when the contract volume Q is large, R decreases with
price volatility σ. This can be adequately explained by the interaction between
the underlying stochastic prices and the strategic role of the gas contract. By
interacting between a spot market and a gas contract, the contract buyer can
strategically allocate its contract usage when the spot price is high. On the other
hand, the expected spot price will increase as the price volatility σ increases,
leading to a higher spot trading cost. Note that when the assigned contract
quantity Q is low, the impact of increasing spot price dominates the strategic role
of contract. Consequently, the expected total cost grows with the price volatility.
But with a large contract amount Q, the buyer could gain more benefits (reduce
its supply cost) if the spot market becomes more volatile.
It should be noted that the optimal contract quantity Q∗ does not increase
with the price volatility σ. This can be accounted for by the termination rule of
discarding remaining make up gas at the end of the time horizon. If the contract
size is too large, chances are that some make up gas will be left worthless at
the end, causing an unnecessary loss. Another possible explanation would be
that a large contract volume increases the risk of loss of a part of make up
gas in each calendar month, due to the limited capacity of the make up bank.
Nevertheless, the expected total cost R(Q∗) at the optimal contract quantity is
declining with the price volatility σ. This is because the optimal contract quantity
is large enough for the GENCO to enjoy the cost reduction from the interaction
between market transaction and contract consumption, especially for a highly
volatile spot market.
Subsequently, we quantitatively evaluate the value of make up clause for
different values of price volatility, as presented in Table 5.4. The statistics indicate
that investment in the take-or-pay contract is economically favorable, as all of
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(a) Price Volatility σ = 0.024 (b) Price Volatility σ = 0.048
(c) Price Volatility σ = 0.072 (d) Price Volatility σ = 0.096
Figure 5.7: Effect of price volatility σ on expected total cost R
the ROI indexes are higher than the 5% annual risk-free interest rate. Moreover,
incorporation of make up clause will consistently bring more benefits. It is also
evident that both the return on investment and value of make up clause increase
with the price volatility σ. This finding confirms the necessity of incorporating
make up clause in the take-or-pay contract.
Table 5.4: Impact of price volatility on value of make up clause
Price Volatility σ 0.024 0.048 0.072 0.096
ROIMU(%) 8.6678 13.7810 19.3556 25.8687
ROINoMU(%) 7.8060 10.4787 14.9884 19.5647
VMU(%) 0.8618 3.3023 4.3672 6.3040
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Impact of Take-or-Pay Level
Another contributing factor is the take-or-pay level. In order to mitigate the
restrictions of the minimum obligation bill for the buyer, the make up clause is
introduced as a supplement of take-or-pay clause. Therefore, we take a close look
at the effect of take-or-pay levels.
(a) High Take-or-pay Level ∆i = 0.8 (b) Low Take-or-pay Level ∆i = 0.5
Figure 5.8: Effect of take-or-pay level ∆i on expected total cost R
In this experiment, we set ∆ = 1, meaning that the GENCO is obligated
to pay all contracted gas throughout the planning horizon. Figures 5.8a and
5.8b show the expected total cost R against the contract quantity Q for two
different monthly take-or-pay levels ∆i = 0.8 and ∆i = 0.5. As can be seen,
when the contract size Q is small (less than 5), the impact of take-or-pay level
can be negligible. However, when the agreed contract quantity Q is large (more
than 5), the expected total cost grows rapidly for a lower take-or-pay level. A
plausible explanation would be that the GENCO is enforced to pay the contract
amount throughout the time horizon, regardless of its allocation strategy. When
the contract volume Q is small, the take-or-pay and make up clause impose
few constraints on contract allocation. Thus, the take-or-pay level makes little
difference, whereas, if the contract quantity Q is too large, the GENCO stands a
higher chance to have some make up gas left worthless at the end of the planning
horizon. With a higher take-or-pay level, the GENCO has an incentive to use more
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contracted gas, leaving less gas at the end. Besides, it also enables the GENCO
to carry more make up gas over to the subsequent month, making full use of the
contracted gas as much as possible. As a result, the optimal contract quantity
Q∗ would increase with take-or-pay level and the corresponding expected total
cost would decrease, as confirmed by Figure 5.8. These findings indicate that
incorporation of make up clause into a take-or-pay contract creates a win-win
situation for both contracting parties. For the buyer, it reduces the expected total
cost and enhances the return on investment. From the supplier’s perspective, it
guarantees the capital return and accelerates the fund flow, as the GENCO is
willing to sign a contract with higher monthly take-or-pay level when make up
clause is incorporated.
5.6.3 Performance of LSPI Algorithm
As discussed in Section 5.4, the computational effort of solving the MMDP model
via standard backward dynamic programming increases exponentially with re-
spect to the time periods. The proposed LSPI algorithm is tailored for long horizon
large scale MMDP. The first relevant issue to be investigated is the convergence
guarantee of the LSPI algorithm.
Convergence Guarantee
The convergence is detected by maximum absolute change between value func-




i ), l = 1, 2, · · · , L be
evenly spaced measure points at month i (Specifically, we let Qi vary from 0 to
9 at the interval of 0.2, Mi vary from 0 to 1 at the step of 0.2, and we have 13
discretized prices pi for each month. To sum up we select 46×6×13 = 3588 mea-
sure points for each month). At each iteration n, the maximum absolute change
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Figure 5.9: Convergence guarantee of LSPI algorithm
(MACn) can be computed by
MACn = max
l=1,2,··· ,L
∣∣(θni )TΨi(Qli,M li , P li )− (θn−1i )TΨi(Qli,M li , P li )∣∣ (5.51)
We implement the LSPI Algorithm 5 for N = 200 iterations. If MACN is small
enough, we say that the proposed algorithm asymptotically converges to a sta-
tionary value function approximation. In this experiment, we use the six-month
problem as an example again for the ease of comparison.
Figure 5.9 plots the maximum absolute changes MACn against iteration num-
ber n. As can be seen, the maximum absolute changes between adjacent value
function approximations do not monotonically decrease, but fluctuate a bit (note
that the y-axis is log-scale). This can be attributed to the errors induced by
statistical regression and finite difference stochastic approximation. Despite the
oscillations, the maximum absolute changes MACn gradually decrease as the algo-
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rithm proceeds. Moreover, the LSPI algorithm produces a fairly stationary value
function approximation since the 100th iteration, from which the maximum abso-
lute change is less than 0.1. It is remarkable that the maximum absolute change
in the 200th iteration is around 0.01. Note that compared with the expected total
cost, this change is at the magnitude of 0.02%, which is impressive.
Accuracy
Having established the convergence guarantee of the LSPI Algorithm 5, we are
then interested in the accuracy of the limiting approximation.
First of all, we can compare the value function approximation between the
proposed LSPI algorithm and backward dynamic programming method. Although
the cost-to-go function in the DP method is not exactly the true optimal value
function due to the existence of discretization errors, it can serve as a good
benchmark for comparison. The comparison between cost-to-go functions of the
DP method and the final value function approximations of LSPI algorithm at
the 200th iteration is shown in Figure 5.10. Overall, the LSPI value function
approximations are close to the cost-to-go functions for 2 ≤ Q ≤ 6, implying
a good approximation. However, the approximation worsens for the situation
of Q < 2 and Q > 6. This can be accounted for by the nonlocal behaviors of
polynomial regression such that the estimation of a certain state s0 can strongly
depend on observations at other state s far from s0 (Magee, 1998). Therefore,
the approximation near the boundary would be much worse than that in the
central area.
A fairer comparison is to compare the expected total costs of implementing
the policies we obtained from the LSPI algorithm and standard DP method to the
same trajectories. Table 5.5 displays the average value and standard error of the
performance of the LSPI algorithm and DP method on the same 1000 price and
demand trajectories for different contract size Q. The gray row highlights the
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(a) M1 = 0.0 (b) M1 = 0.2
(c) M1 = 0.4 (d) M1 = 0.6
(e) M1 = 0.8 (f) M1 = 1.0
Figure 5.10: Value function approximation comparison between LSPI and DP
performance of the two methods at the optimal quantity Q∗ indicated by Figure
5.6a.
It is evident that the standard error decreases with the contract size Q, as
expected. This can be adequately explained by the hedging role of the contract.
By locking a proportion of natural gas supply in the contract, the GENCO can
120
Table 5.5: Performance comparison between LSPI and DP
Quantity Q
LSPI DP
Average value Standard error Average value Standard error
0 53.1545 3.9990 53.1545 3.9990
1 52.5260 3.4716 52.2896 3.7555
2 51.8581 3.0557 51.6001 3.5796
3 51.2400 2.7516 50.9156 3.2983
4 50.6742 2.4828 50.3397 2.9710
5 50.2461 2.2325 49.9239 2.5821
6 49.9980 1.9509 49.6226 2.1947
6.8∗ 49.9146 1.7370 49.4946 1.9991
7 49.9161 1.6831 49.4532 1.9431
8 50.0722 1.4855 49.5448 1.7096
9 50.5530 1.3911 49.8224 1.4631
10 52.6437 1.5648 51.4986 1.3116
substantially reduce the risk of spot trading at a price spike. Note that an ex-
ception occurs at a high contract quantity Q = 10, in which it is very likely that
there remains some make up gas at the end of the planning horizon for certain
sample paths. As a result, the total costs along these trajectories are significantly
higher than others, leading to a large standard error. More noteworthy is that
the standard error of the sample total cost is relatively large compared with the
average value. This can be attributed to the fact that the sample total cost along a
trajectory is a cumulative discounted monthly cost over 6 months. Consequently,
the sample variance is accumulating the variance of each discounted monthly
cost. Therefore, the standard error is significant, which creates a demand for
future research on related risk-averse analysis.
As also shown in Table 5.5, the mean performance of LSPI is inferior to that
of DP, but its standard error is consistently lower than DP’s standard error. This
can be attributed to the rounding errors when implementing the policy obtained
from the standard DP method. By rounding off the sampled states to the nearest
discretized states the standard error might grow. In particular, for the case of the
optimal contract quantity Q∗ = 6.8, the mean performance of the LSPI algorithm
is worse than that of DP by 0.85%. But in view of the standard error, it is hard to
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say the DP method outperforms the LSPI algorithm. It requires the comparison
of elapsed CPU time for further clarification.
Efficiency
Another measurement of interest is efficiency — how fast can the LSPI algorithm
produce a fairly good result and how does it scale to problems with longer time
horizon.
For the experiment, we run the Matlab code on a 64-bit desktop with Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-2500, 3.30 GHz CPU. Recognizing that the structure of the problem
is suitable for parallelization, we utilize the embedded parallel computation tools
to boost the computational speeds. The elapsed CPU time of the standard DP
method and the proposed LSPI algorithm is recorded for problems ranging from
6 to 24 months, as reported in Table 5.6. We remark that the recorded CPU time
for the LSPI algorithm is the average of the elapsed CPU time of 10 replications.
Each replication is implemented for 100 iterations, since the algorithm produces
a relatively stationary approximation at the 100th iteration in terms of the maxi-
mum absolute changes MACn. It is also worth noting that due to the notorious
curse of dimensionality, the computational effort required to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the DP method is very expensive for large scale problems (more than
12 months). Therefore, we approximate the corresponding CPU time (marked by
asterisks in Table 5.6) according to the computational complexity.
Table 5.6: CPU time (hours) comparison between LSPI and DP
Algorithm
Time periods (Months)
6 9 12 15 18 21 24
DP 0.89 3.40 8.69 16.61∗ 29.03∗ 52.21∗ 71.84∗
LSPI 0.59 0.83 1.06 1.27 1.69 2.01 2.30
As shown in Table 5.6, the proposed LSPI algorithm requires much less CPU
time than the standard DP method, especially for problems with long periods.
Recall that the mean performance of the proposed LSPI algorithm is inferior to the
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DP method by 0.85% for the 6-month problem, but the associated computational
requirement is only 66.3% of the latter one. The ratio would be more remarkable
for a 12-month problem (12.2%) or a 24-month problem (approximately 3.2%).
In view of the impressive CPU time, the discrepancy of the associated mean
performance (0.57%) for the 12-month problem is tolerable. It is also found that
the CPU time required by the LSPI algorithm increases linearly with the time
periods. These results suggest that the DP method can only apply to small scale
problems, while the proposed LSPI algorithm is a promising method to solve a
large scale MMDP problem efficiently.
5.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we studied an optimization problem of dynamically allocating
a medium-term natural gas contract taking into account the emerging make up
clause. In view of the hierarchical structured decision making at multi-time scale,
an MMDP model was built to address the connection between monthly nomina-
tion and daily contract allocation. The model provides valuable insights into the
interaction of decision making at two time levels, induced by the make up clause.
Subsequently, with an approximation of the value of make up gas, a subopti-
mal threshold policy was established for the lower time level MDP to facilitate
daily contract allocation. Meanwhile, a least-squares policy iteration algorithm
was developed for the upper time level MDP, within which a finite difference
stochastic approximation method was tailored to the embedded optimization
problem involving decision dependent uncertainty. Moreover, the proposed al-
gorithm was guaranteed to converge and the error bound of the limiting value
function approximation was established.
In the numerical experiments, we quantitatively measured the value of make
up clause by the increment of return on investment. The impacts of seasonality,
price volatility and take-or-pay level on the value of make up clause were closely
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examined as well. It was found that the value of make up clause increases with
the price volatility as expected. Furthermore, incorporation of the make up clause
into the traditional take-or-pay contract not only brings benefits to the buyer, but
also helps the supplier to accelerate its capital return. Finally, we evaluated the
performance of the proposed LSPI algorithm in terms of convergence guarantee,
accuracy and efficiency. The superior performance of the proposed LSPI algorithm
demonstrates its applicability to a large scale MMDP model.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
The primary objective of this thesis is to develop a novel framework for dynamic
natural gas contract allocation and valuation for a GENCO, accounting for volatile
spot prices and various contractual flexibilities. In this chapter, we summarize the
main results and contributions, followed by recommending potential directions
for future research.
In Chapter 3, we investigated a short-term stochastic natural gas supply man-
agement problem, upon which the profitability of the GENCO heavily relies. It
was found that a stage and price dependent base stock policy is optimal for dy-
namically allocating the bilateral gas contract over a finite planning horizon. The
optimal policy should provide a valuable guideline for the GENCO to promptly
manage its natural gas supply responding to the frequently changing market
conditions. We also theoretically proved that the optimal base stock target levels
are monotonically decreasing in the revealed spot price, which is consistent with
our intuition. This price monotonicity can help to gain a better understanding
of the optimal decision rule. With the constructed trinomial price scenario tree,
the optimal base stock target levels can be easily computed. This points to the
feasibility of the optimal base stock policy in practice. The numerical analyses
on the value of stochastic solution revealed that the GENCO can gain remark-
able benefits from the bilateral contract by taking price volatility into account
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when making decisions. The findings have provided managerial insights into the
strategical role of bilateral contracts in addition to the well known hedging role.
In the preceding analysis, we focused on the optimization problem of dy-
namic contract allocation under the assumption that the contractual relationship
has been established. Subsequently, it is of interest to find the optimal contract
quantity to engage, as well as the corresponding optimal contract price that is
mutually acceptable for both contracting parties. In Chapter 4, we addressed
the issue of contract negotiation and price determination in a Nash bargaining
game framework. Based on the SDP model built in Chapter 3, we can evaluate
the value of the bilateral contract for a GENCO. By incorporating the contract
valuation for both the GENCO and the supplier, we rigorously showed that there
is always the possibility that the contracting parties can negotiate to reach a mu-
tually acceptable contract price. This phenomenon can be mainly attributed to
the asymmetric demand uncertainty information for the GENCO and the supplier
in the decision making process. Furthermore, the contract negotiation process
was modeled as an asymmetric Nash bargaining game. The existence and unique-
ness of the equilibrium solution revealed that the optimal contract quantity and
price can be separately determined in sequence in the bargaining process. The
finding may contribute to considerably simplifying the contract negotiation strat-
egy. It was also found that the optimal contract quantity does not depend on
the bargaining power and the optimal contract price is a weighted average of
the contract valuations. The result was further confirmed by numerical exper-
iments under various market conditions, which validates the feasibility of the
proposed Nash bargaining model. Moreover, the numerical results also suggested
that the optimal contract quantity is nonmonotonic in spot price variation, which
is in agreement with the result reported by Dong and Liu (2007). The proposed
contract pricing method is of crucial importance in terms of designing and nego-
tiating a bilateral contract that suits for both contracting parties’ needs.
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In reality, many gas contracts are designed to cover gas delivery for a cou-
ple of months or even years. Those contracts are commonly equipped with a
diversity of flexibility, including the minimum obligation and emerging make
up clause, which entail a multi-time scale model to deal with the interaction of
decision makings in different time levels. In Chapter 5, an MMDP model was de-
veloped to address the hierarchical structured sequential decision making, where
the monthly nomination and daily contract allocation are integrated in a unified
framework. The MMDP model has shed new light on medium-term contract allo-
cation at multiple time scales. In addition, we established a suboptimal threshold
policy for the lower time level MDP, which facilitates daily contract allocation
strategy for given monthly nomination and make up gas. One key contribution
of this study is that we proposed an LSPI algorithm embedded with an FDSA
method, which is tailored for the specified upper time level MDP problem involv-
ing decision dependent uncertainty. Furthermore, it has been theoretically and
numerically shown that the policy produced by the proposed algorithm converges
to a stationary approximation near the optimal performance. More noteworthy
is that the required computation efforts of the proposed algorithm grow linearly
over the time horizon, lending itself to promising applications on large scale
problems. The performance of the proposed algorithm was also validated by a
variety of numerical results in terms of convergence guarantee, accuracy and
efficiency. Several numerical experiments were also conducted to quantitatively
assess the value of make up clause. It was also found that the value of make
up clause is significantly impacted by seasonality, price volatility and take-or-pay
level. These computational analyses have provided clear evidence of the merits
of incorporating the make up clause into the traditional take-or-pay contract.
To summarize, this study has provided valuable insights into the dynamic con-
tract allocation and valuation both in short-term and medium-term, faced with
volatile spot prices and contractual flexibility. However, we have to acknowledge
the existence of the embedded limitations in the study. Firstly, it should be noted
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that the gas supplier faces more flexibility restrictions when making decisions
in practice. In this sense, its contract valuation is overestimated in our study. In
other words, the compromised contract price in a real situation should be a little
higher than the result obtained from the Nash equilibrium model. Unfortunately,
it is not an easy task to adjust the formulation of the supplier’s contract valu-
ation appropriately. We therefore recommend the empirical adjustment of the
supplier’s negotiation power to compensate the overestimation. The adjustment
may lead to a more fair and reasonable contract price for both contracting parties.
Another deficiency exists in establishing the suboptimal threshold policy for the
lower time level MDP in Chapter 5. Because of the hierarchical structure of the
problem, the value of make up gas that is carried over to the subsequent month is
unavailable. This lack of information drives us to employ an approximation that
results in a suboptimal policy. It is therefore in dire need of a good approximation
with performance guarantee.
There are several interesting and challenging directions that can be consid-
ered for future research in the field presented in this thesis. A natural direction
for future study is to extend the proposed contract pricing framework to a more
general situation where multiple participants are involved in the contract nego-
tiation. Introducing multiple participants definitely complicates the problem. It,
therefore, necessitates some sophisticated tools in game theory to analyze the
complex contract negotiation process. Another possible avenue for future work
is to incorporate the risk attitude of the contract holder in the decision making.
Note that bilateral contracts were initially created for hedging against the risk
exposure caused by volatile market prices and stochastic demands. It is natu-
ral to extend the risk-neutral MMDP model to a risk-averse one by introducing
some prevailing risk measurements in finance, such as, Value at Risk (VaR) and
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR).
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Appendix A
Proofs in Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof: Consider period t ∈ T . Since both xt and at are defined in <1, it holds that
X andAt are latticed by definition. Hence, X ×At is also a lattice, following from
the result that the direct product of lattices is a lattice (Topkis, 1998). Define
Vt+1(xt− at, pt, Dt) as V t+1(xt, at) for given pt and Dt. Pick any feasible inventory






t ) ∈ X × At. To verify the claimed submodularity





t) ∨ (x′′t , a′′t )) + V t+1((x′t, a′t)) ∧ (x′′t , a′′t ) ≤ V t+1(x′t, a′t) + V t+1(x′′t , a′′t )
(A.1)














t) − V t+1(x′′t , a′′t ) = 0. For the other scenario that x′t < x′′t and a′′t < a′t,
inequality (A.1) is now shown to be the case by Lemma 2.6.2 in Topkis (1998).
Let y′t = x
′





t) ∨ (x′′t , a′′t )) + V t+1((x′t, a′t) ∧ (x′′t , a′′t ))− V t+1(x′t, a′t)− V t+1(x′′t , a′′t )
= Vt+1(x
′
t ∨ x′′t − a′t ∨ a′′t , pt+1, Dt+1) + Vt+1(x′t ∧ x′′t − a′t ∧ a′′t , pt+1, Dt+1)
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−Vt+1(x′t − a′t, pt+1, Dt+1)− Vt+1(x′′t − a′′t , pt+1, Dt+1)
= Vt+1(x
′′
t − a′t, pt+1, Dt+1) + Vt+1(x′t − a′′t , pt+1, Dt+1)
−Vt+1(x′t − a′t, pt+1, Dt+1)− Vt+1(x′′t − a′′t , pt+1, Dt+1)
= Vt+1(y
′
t + δ, pt+1, Dt+1)− Vt+1(y′t, pt+1, Dt+1)
−[Vt+1(y′′t + δ, pt+1, Dt+1)− Vt+1(y′′t , pt+1, Dt+1)]
≤ 0 (A.2)
The inequality holds because the convexity of Vt(xt, pt, Dt) in xt implies that
Vt(yt + δ, pt, Dt) − Vt(yt, pt, Dt) is increasing in yt for given pt, Dt and δ > 0.
Therefore, inequality (A.1) holds for any (xt, at) ∈ X × At. Corollary 2.6.2 in
Topkis (1998) implies that Ut(xt−at, pt) is submodular in (xt, at) ∈ X ×At, since
expectation preserves submodularity. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof: The claimed piecewise linearity of Vt(xt, pt, Dt) can be shown by mathe-
matical induction. In stage T + 1, VT+1(xT+1, pT+1, DT+1) is obviously piecewise
linear in xT+1. Make the induction hypothesis that the stated property also holds
in stages t+ 1, · · · , T .
Now focus on stage t. The optimal base stock policy implies that the expres-
sion of Vt(xt, pt, Dt) depends on the relationship between the remaining contract
level xt and the base stock target BSt(pt). The relationship between the revealed
demand Dt and the withdraw capacity Cd further partitions the feasible action
into two scenarios by whether the base stock target level BSt(pt) is achievable
from xt or not. Therefore two cases are necessary to be considered: Dt ≥ Cd and
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Dt < Cd. In the former case of Dt ≥ Cd, it holds that
Vt(xt, pt, Dt) =

ptDt + Ut(xt, pt), if xt ≤ BSt(pt);
pt(Dt − xt +BSt(pt)) + Ut(BSt(pt), pt), ifBSt(pt) < xt ≤ BSt(pt) + Cd;
pt(Dt − Cd) + Ut(xt − Cd, pt), if xt > BSt(pt) + Cd;
(A.3)
Consider the three cases in (A.3) separately.
Case 1: xt ≤ BSt(pt), Vt(xt, pt, Dt) = ptDt + Ut(xt, pt). Piecewise linearity of
Vt+1(xt, pt+1, Dt+1) in xt indicates that Ut(xt, pt) is also piecewise linear in xt for
given pt.
Case 2: BSt(pt) < xt ≤ BSt(pt) + Cd. Vt(xt, pt, Dt) = pt(Dt − xt + BSt(pt)) +
Ut(BSt(pt), pt)). Ut(BSt(pt), pt)) is independent of xt, since the base stock target
level BSt(pt) is independent of xt. Also pt(Dt − xt +BSt(pt)) is trivially linear in
xt.
Case 3: xt > BSt(pt) + Cd, Vt(xt, pt, Dt) = pt(Dt − Cd) + Ut(xt − Cd, pt). Similar
to Case 1, Ut(xt − Cd, pt) is piecewise linear in xt for given pt.
Accordingly, it is not difficult to verify that Vt(xt, pt, Dt) is also piecewise linear
in xt. On the other hand, when Dt < Cd, we can achieve the same result in a
similar way. Therefore the claimed property holds for all periods by the principle
of mathematical induction.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof: According to Lemma 3.6, Vt(xt, pt, Dt) is piecewise linear in xt, hence
the left and right derivatives of Vt(xt, pt, Dt) in terms of xt exists for all xt ∈ X
except for the boundary, where the left derivative is unavailable at xt = 0 and
the right derivative is unavailable at xt = Q. Without loss of generality, define
V ′t (xt, pt, Dt) as the right derivative of Vt(xt, pt, Dt) at xt ∈ [0, Q) and its left
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derivative at xt = Q.
V ′t (xt, pt, Dt) = lim
→0
Vt(xt + , pt, Dt)− Vt(xt, pt, Dt)

, t ∈ T , xt ∈ [0, Q) (A.4)
V ′t (xt, pt, Dt) = lim
→0
Vt(xt, pt, Dt)− Vt(xt − , pt, Dt)

, t ∈ T , xt = Q (A.5)
U ′t(xt+1, pt) can be defined in a similar manner. To prove that Vt(xt, pt, Dt) has
decreasing differences in (xt, pt) for given Dt, it suffices to show that [Vt(xt +
, pt, Dt)− Vt(xt, pt, Dt)] decreases in pt for any positive  such that (xt + ) ∈ X
(Topkis, 1998), which is equivalent to show that the right derivative V ′t (xt, pt, Dt)
decreases in pt for given Dt when  approaches to zero. This can be shown by
mathematical induction. It is trivial that the claimed property holds in period
T + 1. Make the hypothesis assumption that it also holds in periods t+ 1, · · · , T .
Now focus on period t. Similar to the proof in Lemma 3.6, two mutually exclusive
cases Dt ≥ Cd and Dt < Cd need to be considered.
In the former scenario Dt ≥ Cd, the corresponding expression of Vt(xt, pt, Dt)
is given by equation (A.3). Denote I(A) as an indicator function which equals to
1 if the containing argument A is true and 0 otherwise. Taking derivative with
respect to xt in both sides of equation (A.3), we obtain that
V ′t (xt, pt, Dt) = U
′
t(xt, pt)I(xt ≤ BSt(pt))
−ptI(BSt(pt) < xt ≤ BSt(pt) + Cd)
+U ′t(xt − Cd, pt)I(xt > BSt(pt) + Cd) (A.6)
To proceed, we need to show that U ′t(xt, pt) is decreasing in pt. Notice that the
optimal value function Vt+1(xt+1, pt+1, Dt+1) can be rewritten as the summation
of the risk neutral value of the cash flows from period t+ 1 to the expiration of
the planning horizon.
Vt+1(xt+1, pt+1, Dt+1) = min
at+1∈At+1








· · ·+ E[ min
aT∈AT
(D˜T − aT )p˜T ]
]]
(A.7)
For any x1t+1, x
2
t+1 ∈ Xt+1, the difference between Vt+1(x1t+1, pt+1, Dt+1) and
Vt+1(x
2
t+1, pt+1, Dt+1) is the benefit by allocating the additional |x1t+1 − x2t+1|
amount of contract gas in the remaining periods. It is not difficult to derive that







k=t+1 E(p˜k|pt+1) <∞ holds by Assumption 3.4. Hence Vt+1(xt+1, pt+1, Dt+1)
is Lipschitz continuous in xt+1. In particular, pick any xt+1 in [0, Q) and any
positive  such that (xt+1 + ) ∈ [0, Q), and we have







The Dominated Convergence Theorem (Resnick, 1999) implies that the expecta-
tion and derivative are interchangeable in this case.
U ′t(xt+1, pt) = lim
→0










Vt+1(xt+1 + , p˜t+1, D˜t+1)− Vt+1(xt+1, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)

|pt]
= E[V ′t+1(xt+1, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)|pt] (A.10)
It is not difficult to verify that the equation (A.10) also holds at xt+1 = Q in
terms of left derivative. The induction hypothesis that V ′t+1(xt+1, pt+1, Dt+1) de-
creases in pt+1 and Assumption 3.4 that the distribution F (p˜t+1|pt) stochastically
increases in pt together imply that U ′t(xt+1, pt) = E[V ′t+1(xt+1, p˜t+1, D˜t+1)|pt] de-
creases in pt, following from Corollary 3.9.1 in Topkis (1998). Similarly, we can
show that U ′t+1(xt − Cd, pt) also decreases in pt. It follows from equation (A.6)
that V ′t (xt, pt, Dt) is decreasing in pt. On the other hand, the same result can
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be achieved in the counterpart scenario Dt < Cd in a similar manner. Hence,
the stated property also holds in stage t. Therefore the mathematical induction
principle implies that it holds for all periods .
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Appendix B
Proofs in Chapter 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof: We show the bounds by backward induction. At the terminal stage t =
T + 1, it is evident that J¯pinT+1(sT+1) = J
n−1
T+1(sT+1), since no decision is involved
at this stage. Make the hypothesis that the bound performance (5.43) also holds
for stage t+ 1, · · · , T . For stage t




t , ωt), ωt+1)]
≤ E
[
Ct(st, at) + γ
(
Jn−1t+1 F (st, a
n







Ct(st, at) + γJ
n−1
t+1 (F (st, a
n

















where the first equality is based on the definition of J¯pint (st, ωt), while the inequal-
ity follows from hypothesis assumption (5.43). The third equality holds because
ant = argminat E[Ct(st, at) + γJ
n−1
t+1 (F (st, a
n
t , ωt), ωt+1)], and the second inequality
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follows from the definition of ςn−1t in (5.42). The induction proof is completed
by the principle of mathematical induction. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5.7
Proof: For the notational simplicity, we first define sn+1t+1 = Ft(st, a
n+1
t , ωt). By the
definition of J¨n+1t (st, ωt), we have
J¨n+1t (st, ωt) = min
at
Ct(st, at) + γE[Jn+1t+1 (Ft(st, at, ωt), ωt+1)]
≤ Ct(st, an+1t ) + γE[Jn+1t+1 (sn+1t+1 , ωt+1)]
= Ct(st, a
n+1









t+1 , ωt+1)− ni+1(sn+1t+1 , ωt+1))]
= (1− αn){Ct(st, an+1t ) + γE[Jnt+1(sn+1t+1 , ωt+1)]}+ αnCt(st, an+1t )
+αnγE[J¯pin+1t+1 (sn+1t+1 , ωt+1) + wnt+1(sn+1t+1 , ωt+1)− nt+1(sn+1t+1 , ωt+1)]
= (1− αn)J¨nt (st, ωt) + αnJ¯pin+1t (st, ωt) (B.2)





and Assumption 5.5 that approximation errors wnt and 
n
t are white noise with
zero mean. Combining (5.41) and (B.2) yields
J¨n+1t (st, ωt)− Jn+1t (st, ωt)
≤ (1− αn)J¨nt (st, ωt) + αnJ¯pin+1t (st, ωt)
− [(1− αn)Jnt (st, ωt) + αn(J¯pin+1t (st, ωt) + wn+1t (st, ωt)− n+1t (st, ωt))]
= (1− αn)[J¨nt (st, ωt)− Jnt (st, ωt)]− αn[wn+1t (st, ωt)− n+1t (st, ωt)] (B.3)
Let Y nT (st, ωt) = J¨
n
t (st, ωt)−Rnt (st, ωt). We establish that
Y n+1t (st, ωt) ≤ (1− αn)Y nt (st, ωt) + αn[n+1t (st, ωt)− wn+1t (st, ωt)] (B.4)
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Construct an auxiliary sequence Y
n+1
t (st, ωt) of the form
Y
n+1
t (st, ωt) = (1− αn)Y nt (st, ωt) + αn(n+1t (st, ωt)− wn+1t (st, ωt)) (B.5)
with Y
0
t (st, ωt) = Y
0
t (st, ωt) for all st ∈ St×Ωt and t = 1, 2, · · · , T . It is not difficult




t (st, ωt) = Y
n
t (st, ωt)− αn(Y nt (st, ωt) + wn+1t (st, ωt)− n+1t (st, ωt)) (B.6)
It resembles to the updating rule of a stochastic gradient algorithm for mini-
mizing f(Y t(st, ωt)) = Y
2
t (st, ωt)/2. According to Assumption 5.5, it is evident
that E[wn+1t (st, ωt) − n+1t (st, ωt)] = 0 and E[wn+1t (st, ωt) − n+1t (st, ωt)]2 =
E[wn+1t (st, ωt)]2 + E[n+1t (st, ωt)]2 < ∞. Example 4.3 in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis
(1996) implies that the process Y
n
t (st, ωt) converges to ∇f(Y t(st, ωt)) = 0, under





t (st, ωt) = 0,∀(st, ωt) ∈ St × Ωt, t = 1, 2, · · · , T (B.7)
Therefore, lim
n→∞








Y nt (st, ωt) ≤ 0 (B.8)
The convergence of ςnt to some scalar less than or equal to zero implies that
there exists an iteration count nk such that ςnt ≤ 0,∀n ≥ nk. From (5.45),
we can conclude that E[Jn+1t (st, ωt)|Jnt (st, ωt)] ≤ Jnt (st, ωt) for a subsequence
n = nk, nk+1, · · · for all (st, ωt) and t = 1, 2, · · · , T . That is, Jnt (st, ωt) is a super-
martingale for n = nk, nk+1, · · · . As Jnt (st, ωt) = (θnt )TΨ(st, ωt), it is clear that
E[|Jnt (st, ωt)|] < ∞. It then follows from Doob’s martingale convergence theo-
rem (Doob, 1953) that Jnt (st, ωt) → J∞t (st, ωt) almost surely for all (st, ωt) and
t = 1, 2, · · · , T . This completes the proof. 
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 5.8
Before proceeding, we first introduce a useful lemma that is required in the proof.
Lemma B.1. Let g(z) and h(z) be any functions defined on a closed and bounded





















Denote z1 ∈ argmin g(z) and z2 ∈ argminh(z) . Let z ∈ argmin(g(z) − h(z)) and
z¯ ∈ argmax(g(z)− h(z)). It is clear that g(z)− h(z) ≤ g(z1)− h(z1). Adding h(z2)








(g(z)− h(z)) ≥ min
z∈Z
(−|g(z)− h(z)|) (B.11)







(g(z)− h(z)) ≤ max
z∈Z
|g(z)− h(z)| (B.12)







Define an auxiliary variable %t = ||J∞t − J¨∞t ||∞ = max
st,ωt
|J∞t (st, ωt)− J¨∞t (st, ωt)|
for the ease of ensuing analysis. The first part in the proof of Proposition 5.8
resembles to that of Lemma 6.1 in Nadarajah et al. (2013).
Proof: For each stage t = 1, 2, · · · , T , we have
et = ||J∞t − J∗t ||∞
≤ ||J∞t − J¨∞t ||∞ + ||J¨∞t − J∗t ||∞
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= %t + ||J¨∞t − J∗t ||∞ (B.13)
Now, we bound the second term
||J¨∞t − J∗t ||∞
= max
st,ωt
∣∣∣J¨∞t (st, ωt)− J∗t (st, ωt)∣∣∣
= max
st,ωt












∣∣J∞t+1(st+1, ωt+1)− J∗i+1(st+1, ωt+1)∣∣
= γ max
st+1,ωt+1
∣∣J∞t+1(st+1, ωt+1)− J∗t+1(st+1, ωt+1)∣∣
= γ||J∞t+1 − J∗t+1||∞ = γet+1 (B.14)
where the first inequality follows from lemma B.1 while the second inequality
holds because we use maximum in place of expectation. The third inequality
follows by |maxz∈Z g(z)| ≤ maxz∈Z |g(z)|. Therefore, we can obtain that et ≤





We now channel the auxiliary variable %t to sampling approximation error and
regression error. The value function updating rule (5.41) can be rearranged as
Jn+1t (st, ωt)−Jnt (st, ωt) = −αn[Jnt (st, ωt)−J¯pin+1t (st, ωt)]+αn[wn+1t (st, ωt)−n+1t (st, ωt)]
When n approaches to infinity, the left hand side Jn+1t (st, ωt)−Jnt (st, ωt) converges
















(|wn+1t (st, ωt)|+ |n+1t (st, ωt)|)













∣∣E [wn+1t (st, ωt)− n+1t (st, ωt)]∣∣
= 0 (B.17)


























(∣∣Jnt (st, ωt)− J¯pin+1t (st, ωt)∣∣+ γ ∣∣E [Jnt+1(sn+1t+1 , ωt+1)− J¯pin+1t+1 (sn+1t+1 , ωt+1)]∣∣)
≤ w∞t + ∞t (B.18)
where the third equality follows from (2.8) and the fourth equality holds because
J¯
pin+1
t (st, ωt) = Ct(st, a
n+1












In the case of approximating the immediate cost Ct(st, at) with C¯t(st, at), the
second term of (B.13) becomes
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||J¨∞t − J∗t ||∞
= max
st,ωt
∣∣∣J¨∞t (st, ωt)− J∗t (st, ωt)∣∣∣
= max
st,ωt








∣∣C¯t(st, at)− Ct(st, at)∣∣+ γmax
st,ωt




∣∣J∞t+1(st+1, ωt+1)− J∗i+1(st+1, ωt+1)∣∣
= esubt + γ max
st+1,ωt+1
∣∣J∞t+1(st+1, ωt+1)− J∗t+1(st+1, ωt+1)∣∣
= esubt + γ||J∞t+1 − J∗t+1||∞ = esubt + γet+1 (B.20)









This completes the proof. 
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